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The Price of Justice: An Analysis of the Costs that are
Appropriately Considered in a Cost-based
Vindication of Statutory Rights Defense to an
Arbitration Agreement
Ramona L. Lampley ∗
ABSTRACT

In the wake of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, parties opposing
enforcement of an arbitration agreement with a class waiver increasingly relied
on the prohibitive-costs-based vindication of statutory rights defense. The
Supreme Court recently held in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant that the effective vindication doctrine cannot be used to invalidate
an otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement with class-action waiver simply
because the opponents have no “economic incentive” to pursue individual
arbitration. However, the Court’s bases for this holding are unclear and
unnecessarily call into question the very existence of the “effective vindication
doctrine.” This Article examines the historical underpinnings of the
prohibitive-costs-based defense and the different frameworks courts have
employed to analyze those costs. These approaches can be summarized as (1) the
subjective approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the litigant’s
ability to pay; (2) the comparative approach, which compares the costs of
arbitration to the costs of proceeding in litigation; (3) the cost/benefit approach,
which compares the costs of arbitration to the likelihood of the plaintiff’s
potential recovery; and (4) the incentive-based approach, which considers
whether the plaintiffs or their potential attorneys have any incentive, given the
costs involved, to pursue their claims. This Article concludes that the
comparative approach is the only approach that is both grounded in the text of
the Court’s vindication of statutory rights jurisprudence and serves the purposes
of the FAA and enforcing statutory rights.

* Ramona L. Lampley is an Assistant Professor of Law at St. Mary’s University School of
Law, where her scholarship focuses on arbitration in the consumer products, commercial, and
employment settings. Many thanks to Stephen Ware, Colin Marks, Dorie Klein, and Amy
Hardberger for their valued comments and suggestions. Additional thanks are due to my
research assistants, Alyse Haugen and Leigh Woitena, for their diligent research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has given an effective
“thumbs up” to arbitration. The Court has held that states may not
treat arbitration clauses with disfavor simply because they involve
low-value consumer claims; 1 that states may not invalidate pre-

1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (holding that the
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dispute arbitration agreements that include personal injury claims on
the basis of public policy; 2 and that federal statutes that prevent
waiver of their substantive rights do not imply a guarantee of a
judicial forum unless that forum is specifically required by statute.3
Most recently, the Court held that an arbitration agreement with
class waiver was enforceable in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, even though the opponents to the agreement argued that
without a class mechanism, they had no economic incentive to
pursue their federal antitrust claims. 4
The clear directive by the Court is that under the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 5 arbitration is a perfectly acceptable
alternative to litigation. Some commentators have argued that this
thwarts access to the courts envisioned by eighteenth-century
norms; 6 others have urged Congress to limit the FAA and explicitly
preclude the use of the class waiver. 7 Further, courts were split as to
the implication of the Court’s recent arbitration cases. 8 While it is
Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s state law rule that “interferes” with arbitration, by
requiring it ex post).
2. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (“West
Virginia’s prohibition against pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongfuldeath claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular
type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.”).
3. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 672–73 (2012) (holding that the
Credit Repair Organizations Act’s grant of a “right to sue” coupled with a provision that
rendered void any substantive right provided by Act did not render claims arising under the Act
inarbitrable).
4. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) The question
presented was “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts, invoking the federal
substantive law of arbitrability, to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do
not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Express,
133 S. Ct. at 594 (No. 12-133), 2012 WL 3091064 at * i (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000).
6. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 168–70 (2011).
7. Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking A Rational Lawyer for Consumer Claims
After the Supreme Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 45 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 435, 473 (2012) (arguing that “Congress should invalidate waivers of collective consumer
action along with pre-dispute arbitration agreements”).
8. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), and overruled by American Express, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013)
[hereinafter Amex III]; Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1159-1161 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012)
(distinguishing Amex III, but then, in an enigmatic footnote, stating that “to the extent that the
Second Circuit’s opinion is not distinguishable, we disagree with it and agree instead with the
Eleventh Circuit”). As Coneff recognizes, the federal appellate courts are split as to whether,
post-Concepcion, an arbitration agreement can be held unenforceable because, in light of the costs
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now settled that California’s Discover Bank rule (rendering
unenforceable arbitration agreements with class-action waivers that
“predictably involve small amounts”) is preempted as a state law
unconscionability defense of wide applicability, 9 the Second Circuit
held that an arbitration agreement is not enforceable when it
deprives prospective litigants of the opportunity to vindicate federal
statutory rights due to a class waiver. 10 This breathed new life into
the vindication of statutory rights defense that is sometimes used to
avoid otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements. 11 Indeed, critics
of the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the context of “low
value” claims turned to the vindication of statutory rights defense as
the last major defense following the Supreme Court’s decision in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.12
The questions arising from the use of this judicially created
defense and from the Court’s decision in American Express abound:
(1) Is the vindication of statutory rights defense based on mere dicta,
or should it survive the Court’s recent pro-arbitration
of individual claims, there is no incentive for individual claimants to pursue statutory rights.
Coneff, 673 F.3d at n.3. Curiously, the Ninth Circuit in Coneff aligned itself with the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Cruz v. Cingular Wireless. 648 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011). But the
Eleventh Circuit specifically declined to address whether an arbitration agreement could be
invalidated on public policy grounds when the effect is to foreclose low-value claims because the
Supreme Court had already held that the same arbitration agreement at issue in Cruz was
sufficient to make the plaintiffs “whole” in Concepcion. Id.
9. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 1750 (2011) (quoting
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1110 (Cal. 2005)).
10. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 217–19 (holding that “[t]he evidence presented by plaintiffs
here establishes, as a matter of law, that the cost of plaintiffs’ individually arbitrating their
dispute with Amex would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory
protections of the antitrust laws”).
11. In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012) (denying petition for
rehearing en banc in Amex III) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (claiming that en banc review is needed
because “[A] the panel opinion is unbounded and can be employed to defeat class-action waivers
altogether; [B] it makes the district court the initial theater of arbitral conflict on the merits
(how else does a district court estimate the cost of a litigation?); and [C] it is already working
mischief in the district courts”). Five judges would have granted the petition for rehearing en
banc in Amex III. Id.
12. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 826 (2012)
(arguing that the defense can even be applied to state law rights); see also Myriam Gilles & Gary
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 623, 647–52 (2012) (arguing that the “effective vindication” doctrine, “properly framed”
is available under state law when the class waiver operates to exculpate or confer de facto
immunity on the defendant, and implicates state common law policy against exculpatory
contracts).
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jurisprudence?;13 (2) If the vindication of statutory rights defense is
viable, and I believe it is, does it only apply to enforcement of federal
statutory rights?; and (3) In a defense based on prohibitive costs to
arbitration, what is the proper framework for analyzing those costs?
As the use of binding arbitration agreements has increased in
popularity in all contexts—commercial, employment, consumer
products, and even health care—the question of when and how such
agreements should be enforced has received much debate.14 This is
exacerbated by the increased presence of the class-action and
arbitration waiver found in many arbitration agreements. 15 As the
Court recently noted, arbitration is ill-suited for adjudicating matters
based on class representation—thus, it seems that arbitration will
proceed individually, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, or
not at all. 16
Critics of arbitration reacted to the class waiver in arbitration
agreements by arguing that such waivers should not be enforced
under two rubrics: state law unconscionability defenses and on the
basis that they deprive litigants of vindicating statutory rights
13. The Court’s decision in American Express calls the continued viability of this doctrine
into question. Justice Scalia writes that the “effective vindication” exception to arbitration
originated as “dictum” in Mitsubishi Motors. American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. Scalia also
opines that “the Court in Mitsubishi Motors did not hold that federal statutory claims are subject
to arbitration so long as the claimant may effectively vindicate his rights in the arbitral forum.”
Id. at n.2 (emphasis added). But many people, myself and Justice Kagan writing for the dissent
included, would argue that Mitsubishi squarely held just that: “An arbitration clause will be
enforced only ‘so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum.’” Id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
14. See, e.g., Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial
Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 478–82 (2009) (analyzing the evolution and use of arbitration
agreements in consumer products and services). For a history of the adoption of the consumer
product arbitration agreement, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383, 398 (2008) (“The practical consequences of the new legal era
were significant. Arbitration left the province of particular business guilds or commercial
environments and shifted to a massive privatization of the adjudicatory function. . . . [A] genre
of new arbitration arose, in which arbitration agreements were essentially imposed upon a large,
general class of consumers and workers.”), and Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 394–98 (2005).
As evidenced by Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012), the use
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements is being adopted even in the health care industry.
15. See Lampley, supra note 14 at 503–17 (discussing the evolution of class-action waivers
in arbitration agreements).
16. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (explaining that
“[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation”).
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because individual costs will be prohibitive. 17 But in Concepcion, the
Court held that a state law that operated to continuously render
class arbitration waivers unconscionable was preempted by the
FAA.18
While
Concepcion certainly does not eradicate
unconscionability as a viable defense, 19 it does mean that class
waivers are not per se unconscionable, particularly when coupled with
the “arbitration-friendly” procedures present in AT&T’s arbitration
clause (such as manufacturer-pays-all arbitration costs, the
availability of double attorney’s fees, and a windfall to the prevailing
plaintiff who recovers more than AT&T’s last settlement offer). 20
After Concepcion, courts continue to struggle with prohibitive-costsbased defenses under the theory that prohibitive costs prevent
vindication of statutory rights. But courts have no consensus on
what factors should be analyzed under a “prohibitive costs” defense
and to what such costs should be compared as a benchmark for
determining whether they are truly prohibitive. 21
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Express has resolved a
piece of the puzzle: an arbitration agreement with a class waiver will
not be unenforceable under a “prohibitive costs” defense simply
because without the class mechanism, the plaintiffs have no
economic incentive to pursue their claims. 22 The lower courts are
now left to determine what is the measure of a litigant being
deprived of his or her opportunity to vindicate statutory rights. Is it
solely a matter of comparative costs? To what extent should
attorneys’ fees be considered in the cost calculation? 23 To what

17. See Lampley, supra note 14 at 490–99 (analyzing the historical defenses to
arbitration).
18. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
19. Id. at 1748. As the Court noted, Section 2’s “saving[s] clause preserves generally
applicable contract defenses,” but nothing in it “suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules
that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.” Id.
20. See id. at 1753 (describing the terms of AT&T’s “consumer friendly” agreement and
citing the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs were “better off” in arbitration than as
members of a class) (emphasis added).
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (“But the fact
that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”).
23. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 729, 768–70 (2006) (arguing that contingency fee agreements should be equally available
to advance arbitration costs as they are to front litigation costs). The availability of contingency
fee agreements with advanced costs, or lack thereof, has been a factor some courts have
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extent do “incentivizing clauses” play a part? And does the litigant’s
inability to hire a lawyer or expert for the potential sums recoverable
individually mean that a court should find an agreement between
two entities unenforceable? To what extent does the lack of
incentives to bring a claim weigh in favor of not bringing the claim at
all? This Article looks to the history of the cost-based defense and
proposes to offer some answers to these questions.
Part II of this Article outlines the history of the Federal
Arbitration Act and the genesis of the “vindication of statutory
rights” defense to arbitration based on prohibitive costs. Part III
analyzes the courts’ different approaches to cost-based defenses and
how those approaches have changed in light of the class arbitration
waiver. Part IV argues that courts have traditionally employed either
one or a hybrid of four different frameworks to assess prohibitive
costs to arbitration. These approaches can be summarized as: (1) the
subjective approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the
litigant’s ability to pay; (2) the comparative approach, which
compares the costs of arbitration to proceeding in litigation; (3) the
cost-benefit approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the
likelihood of the plaintiff’s potential recovery; and (4) the incentivebased approach, which considers whether the plaintiffs or their
potential attorneys have any incentive to pursue their claims, given the
costs involved.24 Part V discusses the effect of American Express on
the cost-based defense. Part VI then analyzes the textual sources for
any given approach and ultimately concludes that the comparative
approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to proceeding in
litigation, is the only approach that is both grounded in the text of
the Court’s vindication of statutory rights jurisprudence and serves
the purposes of the FAA and enforcing statutory rights. Thus, any
comparison based on lack of incentives (a policy based argument), a
claimant’s ability to pay, or the likely costs of recovery, will yield
decisions that are overly protective of the judicial forum. An
otherwise binding arbitration agreement should only be invalidated
on the basis that costs prevent a litigant from vindicating statutory
rights when the litigant shows that the costs of proceeding in
arbitration, as compared to litigation costs, are truly excessive.
considered in considering the prohibitive costs of arbitration. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 664 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (noting that due to the contingency fee
arrangement, many litigants would face “minimal” costs in the judicial forum, while the litigant
may have to pay the fees of the arbitrator in the arbitral forum).
24. See infra Part VI and notes 219–22.
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II. THE FAA AND GENESIS OF THE VINDICATION OF STATUTORY RIGHTS
DEFENSE
The FAA declares that all “contract[s] evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 25 As
courts have echoed since its enactment in 1925, the FAA was passed
“in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements.” 26 Thus, it reflects Congress’s “liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration.” 27 It requires that courts place “arbitration
agreements on equal footing with all other contracts” 28 and “enforce
them according to their terms.” 29
Despite this backdrop, a quarter of a century after the FAA’s
enactment, courts treated arbitration of federal claims with serious
disdain. In the Supreme Court’s 1953 Wilko v. Swan decision, the
Court refused to compel arbitration of a Securities Act claim on the
basis that prospective waiver of the judicial forum was prohibited by
Section 14 of the Securities Act, which rendered any waiver of
compliance with its provisions void. 30 The Securities Act had a

25. 9 U.S.C § 2 (2000).
26. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); see also Hall St.
Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
27. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(emphasis added); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at
24); see also, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 475 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995)
(“[D]ue regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the
scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at
476)).
28. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
29. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 475.
30. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434–45 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The Court reasoned that “the right to select
the judicial forum is the kind of ‘provision’ that cannot be waived under §14 of the Securities
Act.” Id. at 435. The petitioner’s claim in Wilko sounds much like the present-appellees’ claim
protesting the arbitral forum in Amex III. For example, the petitioner argued that Congress
intended “to assure that sellers (of Securities) could not maneuver buyers into a position that
might weaken their ability to recover under the Securities Act. He contends that arbitration lacks
the certainty of a suit at law under the Act to enforce his rights.” Id. at 432. Cf. Brief for
Respondents at 54, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (No.
12-133), 2013 WL 267025, at *54 (arguing that requiring the individual merchants to proceed in
individual arbitration despite high expert costs “would be particularly troubling in the antitrust
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unique provision granting the purchaser (to-be petitioner) with
choice of venue, nation-wide service, and the waiver of any
jurisdictional threshold requirement for diversity cases. 31 In an
exercise of judicial activism, the Court reasoned that the protections
of the Securities Act “require . . . judicial direction to fairly assure
their effectiveness”; thus, the right to judicial review, while not
explicitly provided in the Act, could not be waived.32
Wilko set the stage for sweeping court decisions, striking down
any prospective arbitration agreement that the courts viewed as
involving a claim “inappropriate” for arbitration. 33 The circuit courts
held unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements involving a
host of federal statutory provisions, including claimed violations of
the Sherman Act, the Patent Act, the Railway Labor Act, the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act, and employment
claims under Title VII because the courts viewed the arbitral forum
as unsuitable to hear such claims. 34

A. The Origin of the Vindication of Statutory Rights Doctrine
A monumental sea change came with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 35 a case concerning whether a predispute arbitration agreement between two commercial entities

context, where private enforcement serves important public functions”). See also Brief and
Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants, In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. at 17, 554 F.3d 300
(2d Cir. 2009) (No. 06-1871-cv), 2006 WL 6198567 (“The American Express Card Acceptance
Agreement for small merchants, with its collective action ban, flatly ensures that no small
merchant may challenge American Express’s tying arrangements under the federal antitrust
laws.”).
31. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
32. Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
33. David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights
Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 730–31 (2012) (quoting Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co, 391 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968)).
34. See id. at 734–35 and accompanying notes (describing the history and breadth of the
non-arbitrability doctrine and noting illustrative cases); see also Am. Safety, 391 F.2d at 825,
overruled by Rodriguez, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that Sherman Act claims were inappropriate
for arbitration); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1976), superceded in part by
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2006), and overruled in part by Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahan,
482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Patent Act claims inappropriate for arbitration); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l
v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 627 F.2d 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Railway Labor Act claims not
appropriate for arbitration); Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 939 (3d Cir.
1985), overruled by Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir.
1993) (ERISA claims inappropriate for arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 59–60 (1974) (Title VII).
35. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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could be enforced as to a federal antitrust claim brought by a
domestic corporation against an international corporation. 36 Despite
prior precedent holding that antitrust claims were “inappropriate for
enforcement by arbitration,” 37 the district court held that the
international character of the agreement (including arbitration)
required enforcement even as to antitrust claims. 38 The First Circuit
reversed pursuant to the non-arbitrability doctrine, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari “primarily to consider whether an American
court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by
arbitration when that agreement arises from an international
transaction.” 39 Notwithstanding its purported limitation to
international arbitration agreements, the Mitsubishi decision would
eventually set the stage for enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration of
federal claims.
36. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, a Japanese automobile manufacturer, entered into an
agreement with Soler Chrysler-Plymouth that provided for the direct sales to Soler of Mitsubishi
products and allowed Soler, a Chrysler dealer, to sell and market these Mitsubishi products in
Puerto Rico. Id. at 617. The sales agreement also provided for mandatory arbitration of all
disputes arising out of the agreement. Id. The arbitration was required to proceed in Japan
pursuant to the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. Id. Mitsubishi filed suit
against Soler in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking to
compel Soler to arbitrate its breach-of-contract claims pursuant to the Sales Agreement and the
FAA. Id. Soler denied the allegations in Mitsubishi’s complaint, and counterclaimed against both
Mitsubishi and its co-defendant, alleging various breach of contract claims by Mitsubishi,
defamation claims, and statutory claims, including a cause of action under the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Id. at 620.
37. Id. at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit had held that rights conferred under federal antitrust laws were “of a
character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration” in American Safety Equipment Corporation
v. J.P. Maguire & Co, 391 F.2d at 827. The other circuits uniformly adopted this holding. See, e.g.,
Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978) (refusing
to enforce arbitration agreement when antitrust issues permeate the case); Cobb v. Lewis, 488
F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing exception for post-dispute arbitration agreements);
Helfenbein v. Int’l Indust. Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1971); A & E Plastik Pak Co. v.
Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715–16 (9th Cir. 1968). Each of these cases prohibiting the
arbitration of domestic antitrust claims was impliedly overturned by Mitsubishi and Rodriguez v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (reversing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953),
and holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreements covering claims arising under §14 of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77, are enforceable because “Wilko is pervaded by . . . ‘the old
judicial hostility to arbitration.’” (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942))).
38. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 621. The district court ordered the arbitration in reliance on
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515–20 (1974), in which the Supreme Court ordered
arbitration of a claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1932 notwithstanding Wilko, due to
the context of the international agreement.
39. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 624.
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Before reaching the issue of the arbitrability of antitrust claims in
the international context, the Mitsubishi Court addressed Defendant
Soler’s contention that a court may not construe an arbitration
agreement to reach statutory claims unless the party that the statute
was designed to protect expressly agreed to arbitrate those statutory
claims. Turning to the language of the FAA, the Court rejected this
argument, finding “no warrant in the [FAA] for implying in every
contract . . . a presumption against arbitration of statutory
claims.” 40 The Court reasoned that, “[A]s with any other contract,
the parties’ intentions control, but those intentions are generously
construed as to issues of arbitrability.” 41 Ironically, nearly thirty
years ago, the Mitsubishi Court expressed the aspirational sentiment
that “we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals
inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute resolution.” 42 Although the Court did not foreclose the idea
that statutory claims may ever be excluded from the realm of
arbitration, it did hold, in contravention of the non-arbitrability
doctrine, that to exclude the statutory claim from the ambit of the
FAA, Congressional intent must be evident.43

40. Id. at 625. Of course, the Court acknowledged that agreements to arbitrate may be
revoked on the same grounds as those that would require the revocation of any contract, i.e.
fraud, overwhelming economic power, etc., but it stated that “absent such compelling
considerations, the [FAA] provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.” Id. at 627.
41. Id. at 626.
42. Id. 626–27. As the recent flurry of anti-arbitration litigation in the wake of the class
waiver has shown, even thirty years past Mitsubishi and eighty years past the enactment of the
FAA, we are not “well past the time” when suspicion of the desirability and competence of
arbitration inhibits its use. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750
(2011); In re Am. Exp. Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 2012) (cert granted,
133. S. Ct. 594 (2012)) and rev’d sub nom. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013)); Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2012), (recognizing, in
dicta, that “[i]t may be that enforcing arbitration agreements even when the plaintiff is
requesting public injunctive relief will reduce the effectiveness of state laws like the UCL”).
Amex III is a paradigm example. In this arbitration agreement between two businesses to
prospectively arbitrate any disputes, the plaintiffs/small business owners claimed that to enforce
the arbitration agreement would deprive them of vindicating their antitrust claims. This
argument sounds a lot like those heard before and rejected in Mitsubishi.
43. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627. The Court left itself some “wiggle” room. Couching its
holding with the moderate disclaimer that it “is not to say that all controversies implicating
statutory rights are suitable for arbitration.” Id. (emphasis added). This marks the beginning of
the Court’s discomfort with a blanket proclamation that all statutory claims may be arbitrated,
but reluctance to abrogate freedom of contract by delineating just what would make a statutory
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The Court’s reasoning for the express-exclusion requirement
provides the basis for modern-day “vindication of statutory rights”
attacks on arbitration clauses: “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
a judicial, forum.” 44 Because the protected party’s substantive rights
under the statute are preserved and capable of vindication in the
arbitral forum, the party has only “trad[ed] the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration.” 45
Turning to the arbitrability of antitrust issues between a
domestic party and an international party, the Court held that rules
of international comity, the Arbitration Convention, and the
presumption in favor of enforcing freely negotiated contractual
choice of forum provisions outweighed judicial protectionism of
antitrust claims cases. 46 The Court reiterated that a party resisting
arbitration may directly attack the arbitration clause if “enforcement
would be unreasonable and unjust; or that proceedings in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that
[the resisting party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his
day in court.” 47 However, the Court left the legitimacy of the nonarbitrability doctrine as applied in American Safety between domestic
corporations intact. 48

claim unsuitable for arbitration. Of course, parties to the agreement could always draft an
arbitration agreement excluding all or some statutory claims, such as antitrust claims.
44. Id. at 628. The Supreme Court characterized this portion of Mitsubishi’s holding as
dicta in American Express. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. However, as discussed above,
the effective vindication doctrine was a critical piece of the Mitsubishi Court’s holding that
arbitration provided an equally suitable alternative forum.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
48. Id. at 629. Regarding American Safety and the four ideals embraced by the First Circuit
with skepticism, the Court found the second concern—the possibility that contracts which
generate antitrust issues may be contracts of adhesion—unjustified. Id. at 632. With respect to
the judicial retention rationale based on the complexity of the law and evidence, the Court
adhered to the view that “adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration,” and
the parties are free to take into account the complexity of the issue when appointing the
arbitrators. Id. at 633. In addition, the Court noted, at the time of the contract the parties
mutually preferred a procedure that would produce streamlined proceedings and expeditious
results—a preference that would be well-served by reduced complexity. The Court also
recognized that most lower courts following the American Safety doctrine were quite willing to
enforce post-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust issues regardless of levels of complexity.
Id. at 633–34.
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The Court also rejected the proposition that an arbitration
proceeding would pose innate hostility to the free-market ideal of
competition: “We decline to indulge the presumption that the
parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or
unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial
arbitrators.” 49 Finally, the Court rejected the public policy
suggestion that the importance of the private litigant to enforcement
of antitrust laws (as opposed to the government alone) could justify
removal of antitrust claims from the arbitral sphere. Although the
clear import of the Sherman Act’s treble damages provision is to
enable an injured competitor to gain remedial damages, 50 the cause
of action remains at all times under the control of the individual. No
citizen is required to bring an antitrust suit; and no citizen is
prohibited from settling an antitrust suit for less than full value. 51
Thus, a prospective litigant may provide in advance for a mutually
agreeable procedure to settle his controversies, including his
antitrust claims. The cornerstone of the Court’s theory was based on
this premise: “[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function.” 52 Thus, in a case intended to cast arbitration, even of
49. Id. at 634.
50. The Court recounted the legislative history of § 4 of the Clayton Act which, when
reenacted in 1914, “was still conceived primarily as open[ing] the door of justice to every man,
whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured
party ample damages for the wrong suffered.” Id. at 636 (quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 (1914)
(remarks of Rep. Webb)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
51. These two observations by the Court in 1985 still ring true today. In American Express,
the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief urging the Court to affirm the Second Circuit’s
decision holding that the arbitration agreement prohibited vindication of statutory rights. As a
basis for its interest in this matter, the Solicitor General stated:
Private actions are an important supplement to the government’s civil enforcement
efforts under federal competition laws, which the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission have primary responsibility for administering . . . . The
United States therefore has a substantial interest in ensuring that arbitration
agreements are not used to prevent private parties from obtaining redress for
violations of their federal statutory rights.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), 2013 WL 367051 at *1–2. But despite the importance
of private enforcement, no litigant is required to bring an antitrust claim, no matter how
meritorious, and there is no requirement that any litigant see a claim through to final
adjudication.
52. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added). The Court’s focus on the prospective
litigant in this language should not be overlooked. So long as the parties, at the time of drafting
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remedial statutes, on equal or more favorable footing as the judicial
forum, the Court crafted language that would soon give rise to a
method for invalidating arbitration agreements.

B. Post-Mitsubishi: The Increasing Arbitrability of Federal Claims
Mitsubishi laid the foundation for the Court’s sheltering of
arbitration agreements. In the years after Mitsubishi, the Court held
enforceable arbitration agreements as to claims based on various
protective statutes such as § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,53 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 54 § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 55 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 56 Each time, the Court
finessed the contours of the burgeoning vindication of statutory
rights doctrine. In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the
Court held that “[a]bsent a well-found claim that an arbitration
agreement resulted from the sort of fraud or excessive economic
power that ‘would provide grounds for the revocation of any
contract[,]’ the Arbitration Act ‘provides no basis for disfavoring
agreements to arbitration statutory claims by skewing the otherwise
hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.’” 57 Similarly, in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court construed the FAA
to permit courts to “give relief” from arbitration agreements “where
the party opposing the arbitration presents ‘well-supported claims
that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for the
revocation of any contract.’” 58

the arbitration agreement, are not foreclosed of the opportunity to vindicate statutory rights by
choosing the arbitral forum, the arbitration agreement should be upheld regardless of the
parties’ changed circumstances in post-contractual litigation. Like an unconscionability analysis,
the Court’s focus under a vindication of statutory rights analysis should be guided by the ex ante
position of the parties.
53. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
54. Id.
55. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
56. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1991).
57. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627). Note the Court’s
emphasis on a disparity of bargaining power here—i.e., a claim that sounds like a state law
defense of unconscionability or even duress. This is a departure from the Court’s language in
Mitsubishi that focused on whether the prospective litigant could vindicate statutory rights.
58. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483–84. But see id. at 481 (“The shift in the Court’s
views on arbitration away from those adopted in Wilko is shown by the flat statement in
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The next progression in the evolution of the “vindication of
statutory rights” defense came in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane,59
in which the Court enforced a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in
an employment contract. The Gilmer plaintiff contended that claims
arising under the ADEA were inappropriate for arbitration because
the ADEA was designed to address important social policies in
addition to individual grievances. 60 After recognizing Mitsubishi’s
holding that the arbitral forum is an equal, if not better, forum
furthering broad social purposes, the Court reiterated: “[S]o long as
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” 61
Perhaps in reaction to its dicta from earlier cases noted above, the
Court admonished that “[m]ere inequality in bargaining power,
however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.” 62
Closely akin to the plaintiffs in Amex III, Gilmer argued that the
arbitration procedures, which did not provide for class actions or
broad equitable relief, could not adequately further the purposes of
the ADEA. 63 The Court disagreed that this procedural inconsistency
rendered arbitration inconsistent with the ADEA, noting that
arbitrators do have the power to fashion equitable relief and that the
arbitration rules at issue also provided for collective proceedings. 64
Further, the Court recognized the possibility that the EEOC could
still bring an administrative action seeking class-wide or equitable

Mitsubishi: ‘By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.’”).
59. 500 U.S. at 28.
60. Id. at 27.
61. Id. (alterations in original) (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). In contrast to
Mitsubishi, which involved an agreement between two commercial organizations, Gilmer involved
an agreement between an employee and employer. The Court found the distinction irrelevant.
Id. at 33. The Court reminded “courts [to] remain attuned to well-supported claims that the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that
would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract,” but found no such proof in this case.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. For example, the Court noted: “Relationships between securities dealers and
investors . . . may involve unequal bargaining power, but we nevertheless held in Rodriguez de
Quijas and McMahon that agreements to arbitrate in that context are enforceable.” Id.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Id.
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relief. 65 “But,” the Court noted, “even if the arbitration could not go
forward as a class action, or class relief could not be granted by the
arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of
bringing a collective action does not mean individual attempts at
conciliation were intended to be barred.” 66 Thus, the Court
implicitly recognized that an employee still maintains the ability to
effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights under the ADEA in
the arbitral forum even if that forum results in the waiver of the
opportunity to bring a class action.

C. Use of “Vindication of Statutory Rights” as a Defense
The prospective litigant’s ability to “effectively vindicate” statutory
rights in both Mitsubishi and Gilmer was central to the Court’s holding
that those pre-dispute arbitration agreements must be enforced.
Although the Court raised the specter of unequal bargaining power as a
potential defense in cases following Mitsubishi, that theory was
effectively foreclosed in Gilmer’s recognition that unequal bargaining
power alone was not enough to invalidate an enforceable arbitration
agreement. Then in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph 67 the
plaintiff argued that the “vindication of statutory rights” doctrine
should be used as a defense to an arbitration agreement. Randolph
presented the quintessential case of bargaining-power disparity. The
plaintiff, a consumer-purchaser of a mobile home, financed the
transaction through a financial services company.68 The merits of the
plaintiff’s claim alleged that the defendant failed to disclose a finance
charge in violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 69

65. Id. at 33.
66. Id. at 32 (alteration in original). Any concerns about relinquishing class relief through
binding arbitration were lessened by the Court’s recognition that arbitration agreements do not
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief. Id. As
corporate use of the class waiver increases, we should see agencies such as the EEOC and state
attorney generals increase public enforcement in the void left by class actions. See Myriam Gilles
& Gary Friedman, supra note 12 at 660–65 (arguing that state attorney generals, through parens
patriae authority, should “fill the void left by class actions”); see also Lampley, supra note 14 at
517 (arguing that the deterrent effect typically served by class actions could be filled by state
attorney generals or agency enforcement if class actions are diminished by the class waiver).
67. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). Plaintiff Randolph filed class claims under the TILA and Equal
Credit Opportunity Acts, and Defendant Green Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a
binding arbitration agreement. Id. at 83.
68. Id. at 82.
69. Id.
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The Randolph plaintiff argued that the arbitration agreement
should be unenforceable because the agreement’s silence as to who
would bear the costs of arbitration posed such a risk that she would
be unable to enforce her statutory rights under the Truth in Lending
Act.70 In a sentence that would reverberate thousands of times
throughout the lower courts dealing with enforcement of arbitration
clauses, the Court acknowledged: “It may well be that the existence
of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph
from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral
forum.” 71 But the plaintiff had not shown that she would bear such
costs if the matter proceeded to arbitration. 72 The Court held that
Randolph’s “risk” of being “saddled with prohibitive costs [was] too
speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.” 73
Randolph did two things that are critical to understanding the
current state of a cost-based defense to arbitration: (1) it recognized
the potential for invalidation of an arbitration agreement based on
prohibitive costs, and (2) it placed that burden on the party seeking
invalidation. But the Court refused to address the next logical
question: what kind of showing of prohibitive expense must be met
to justify a decision that arbitration is prohibitively expensive? 74 The
sub-inquiries are numerous. What kinds of costs are properly
considered as arbitration costs? Do they include costs that would be
inherently bound up in litigation, such as expert fees or costs of
discovery? How should the burden of proof be met, by affidavit or
preliminary hearing? And how much discovery and briefing should
be permitted on this issue? This final question poses a danger of
swallowing the entire proceeding in extensive discovery in what
should be a relatively simple exercise to enforce, or not enforce, an
arbitration agreement. The result we see in American Express, in
which the parties have been tied up in Court nine years simply on
the arbitration issue, is not in accord with the intent of the FAA or
70. Neither party disputed the arbitration clause’s applicability to all claims, even
statutory claims, arising under the contract, and Ms. Randolph did not contend that the TILA
evinces a clear intention by Congress to preclude waiver of judicial (or class) remedies. Id. at 90.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 91.
74. Id. at 92 (“How detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party
seeking arbitration must come forward with contrary evidence is a matter we need not discuss;
for in this case neither during discovery nor when the case was presented on the merits was
there any timely showing at all on the point.”).
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the intended implications of Randolph. By leaving this question open,
the Court caused parties to arbitration agreements to have uneven
application and uncertainty in the law.
But there are some buried guideposts in the footnoted dicta of
Randolph. In rather lengthy footnote six, the Court recounts the
record evidence on which the plaintiff relied to show prohibitive
costs. In her motion to reconsider before the trial court, the plaintiff
acknowledged that the arbitration agreement was silent as to
selection of arbitral forum or arbitrator. 75 Thus, the plaintiff
“assumed” the filing would be with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA). 76 The plaintiff also assumed the filing fee for
claims under $10,000 was $500, which did not include the costs of
the arbitrator or administration fees. 77 The plaintiff also cited an
article published by the Bureau of National Affairs, entitled Labor
Lawyers at ABA Session Debate Role of American Arbitration Association, in
which an AAA executive noted that the average arbitral fee is $700
per day. 78 The Court gave these assumptions no credence, as the
plaintiff had made no showing that her arbitration would proceed in
the AAA, or that if it did, that she would actually incur those charges
referenced. 79 The Court declined to address the plaintiff’s contention
that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it
prevented her from bringing her TILA claims as a class action. 80 The
arbitration agreement was silent as to the availability of class claims.
75. Of course, it is curious that the negative implication of this drafting error resulted in
construal against the plaintiff, who had no arm’s length negotiation as to its terms.
76. Id. at 90 n.6.
77. Id. But the plaintiff submitted no proof of these fees. Although she attached
“informational material from the American Arbitration Association (AAA),” it did not discuss
fees. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at n.7. The Court also did not address the underlying question of whether the
vindication of statutory rights issue is a question of arbitrability reserved for a court to
determine or whether it is a matter for the arbitrator to decide. On the one hand, if the existence
of prohibitive arbitration costs did actually deprive a plaintiff of her opportunity to effectively
vindicate statutory rights, the arbitration agreement would be unenforceable, and hence, a
question for the court to decide in the first instance. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006). On the other hand, if the crux of the vindication of
statutory rights argument is based on an interpretation of the procedures and penalties available
in the arbitration procedures, such as limits on discovery, costs, and damages, the question
should be for the arbitrator to decide. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452
(2003) (holding that the arbitrator should decide procedural gateway matters, such as whether
an arbitration clause permits a class action).
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Thus, Randolph turned what had been a measure of equal
vindication of federal claims in the arbitral forum into a possible
defense to arbitration, if the contesting party could prove that the
arbitral forum was so expensive as to deprive the prospective litigant
of the opportunity to vindicate statutory rights.
III. CONCEPCION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE VINDICATION OF
STATUTORY RIGHTS DOCTRINE
For the next twelve years the Court remained silent as to how to
treat a vindication of statutory rights defense. Due to the federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements and the attractiveness of more
streamlined, potentially cost-effective dispute resolution, employers,
manufacturers, and finance companies adopted pre-dispute
arbitration agreements with some fervor. 81 These pre-dispute
arbitration clauses also evolved to include a binding agreement to
proceed in individual arbitration, waiving any procedural right to
participate in a class proceeding or as a class representative. 82
Arbitration agreements with class waivers were met with two
veins of defenses: state law defenses based on unconscionability and
a defense based on the vindication of statutory rights doctrine. 83
Courts struggled with the application of these doctrines for years
with little guidance on the enforceability of arbitration agreements
that waive a right to proceed as a class representative. But the Court
did resolve a number of procedural issues implicating the viability of
the class-action/arbitration waiver. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, the Court held that questions as to the validity of the
contract as a whole were for the arbitrator to decide, while questions

81. See Gilles, supra note 14, at 394–98; Stempel, supra note 14, at 398 (“The practical
consequences of the new legal era were significant. Arbitration left the province of particular
business guilds or commercial environments and shifted to a massive privatization of the
adjudicatory function. . . . [A] genre of new arbitration arose, in which arbitration agreements
were essentially imposed upon a large, general class of consumers and workers.”); see also
Lampley, supra note 14, at 503–13 (providing a detailed overview of the evolution of arbitration
agreements in consumer product sales from first-generation agreements to third-generation
incentivizing agreements).
82. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 347–49 (2012) (finding class arbitration waivers in 36.5% of
consumer arbitration agreements giving rise to AAA arbitrations in 2007, and 100% use of the
class waiver in consumer agreements involving cell phones and credit cards in the 2007 AAA
sample).
83. See supra note 17.
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as to the validity of the arbitration clause remained within the
province of the court. 84 Then, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp., the Court held that it may not be inferred (by an
arbitrator or a court) that the parties agreed to class-wide arbitration
from an agreement’s silence. 85 Thus, parties could not be compelled
to participate in class-wide arbitration absent a contractual basis for
finding that the parties agreed to do so. 86 The Court’s holding in
Stolt-Nielsen was founded on the recognition that “class-action
arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it
cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to
submit their disputes to an arbitrator.” 87 The Court observed that in
arbitration, parties forgo the judicial rigor and appellate review of the
courts for lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to
choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes. 88 In class
arbitration, the arbitrator no longer resolves a single dispute
between the parties, but instead resolves disputes between hundreds
or even thousands of parties. 89 This drastically raises the stakes of
commercial class arbitration, while the scope of judicial review
remains limited. Given the vast ramifications posed by class
arbitration, it is too great to presume consent to class-wide
arbitration based on silence. 90
Then in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, the Court addressed
whether a state-law rule (California’s) that declared unconscionable
84. 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006). Buckeye extended the separability doctrine first
established in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) to
state courts. STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.20 (2d ed.
2007). Although Buckeye said nothing about the enforcement of class waivers per se, it does have
important implications on the question of who should decide whether the arbitration clause is
enforceable—the court or the arbitrator? If the question as to validity, whether under an
unconscionability or vindication of statutory rights defense, is solely raised against the
arbitration clause, then the issue should be for the court to decide.
85. 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). Stolt-Nielsen also left open the question of who should
decide the issues regarding the scope of the arbitration clause as it pertains to class proceedings.
Id. at 679 (noting that the parties assumed the arbitrator must decide whether the arbitration
clause permitted class proceedings, but that had never been decided by a majority of the Court).
86. Id. at 684.
87. Id. at 685.
88. Id. at 685–86. Note the implications of this last provision on Amex III. Why should
expert costs be as great in arbitration as in litigation, when the theoretical ideal is that
arbitration is more streamlined, more cost-efficient? Indeed, that is presumably one of the
reasons the parties agreed to opt out of litigation in the pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
89. Id. at 686. See also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).
90. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686–87.
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any consumer arbitration agreement in an “adhesion contract” in
disputes that involved small amounts of damages, when it was
alleged that the party with superior bargaining power had carried out
a scheme to cheat consumers out of individual small amounts of
money, is preempted by the FAA.91 Although Concepcion did not
involve and arguably did not speak to a vindication of statutory
rights defense, the application of California’s Discover Bank rule was
quite similar to a vindication of statutory rights analysis. 92 In sum, if
consumers could not vindicate low-dollar claims due to their arbitral
consent to forgo the class action, the arbitration agreement would be
unconscionable and unenforceable under state law.
The Court held that California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted
by the FAA because it “interferes with fundamental attributes of
arbitration.” 93 Allowing a party to demand class arbitration after a
dispute arises thwarts the purpose of arbitration by involving
significantly higher stakes, necessitating additional and different
procedures, and requiring the complex decision of classcertification. 94 The Court acknowledged the public policy arguments
raised by the plaintiffs in favor of permitting class arbitration of such
low-dollar claims. First, the Discover Bank rule was limited to
“adhesion contracts.” But, as the Court noted, “the times in which
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long
past.” 95 Another component of the Discover Bank rule was that
“damages be predictably small.” 96 As the Court observed, this
requirement is malleable—small compared to what measure? 97
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit had held that damages as high as $4,000
were sufficiently small to justify invalidation of an arbitration
agreement under the Discover Bank rule. 98 And the requirement that
the consumer “allege a scheme to cheat consumers” was of no
91. California’s rule, known as the Discover Bank rule, operated to render unconscionable,
and therefore, unenforceable, almost all consumer arbitration agreements with class waivers. See
Lampley, supra note 14, at 491–92.
92. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (stating that
Concepcion “all but resolves this case” because Concepcion rejected the argument that class
arbitration was necessary to prosecute low value claims).
93. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
94. Id. at 1750.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 322 F. App’x 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2009)).
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limiting effect, as that allegation was present in every opposition to a
motion to enforce class action/arbitration claims involving
consumers. 99
Finally, the Court responded to the most important argument for
“vindication of statutory rights” purposes—the public policy
argument that class proceedings are simply necessary to prosecute
“small-dollar claims” that otherwise may go unprosecuted. 100 But,
under the FAA preemption doctrine, states cannot require a
procedure (here, a class procedure) inconsistent with the FAA’s
purposes “even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.” 101 Further,
under AT&T’s incentivizing agreement, the Court noted that it was
“unlikely” that the claim go unresolved on even an individual
basis. 102 AT&T, in a third-generation consumer friendly agreement,
provided that it would pay all costs of arbitration for non-frivolous
claims and provided an incentive compensation of minimum
damages of $7,500 and double attorneys’ fees if the
consumer/plaintiffs obtained an arbitration award greater than
AT&T’s last settlement offer. 103 Thus, the Court rejected the
“incentive-based” public policy argument for rendering arbitration
agreements unconscionable under a state-law defense, but this
holding did not necessarily control the applicability of such an
argument to a cost-based defense under a vindication of statutory
rights theory.
IV. COSTS IN THE VINDICATION OF STATUTORY RIGHTS ANALYSIS POSTRANDOLPH
Since the Randolph Court’s intentional invitation to the lower
courts to develop exactly what and how much expense is
“prohibitive” to vindicating one’s statutory rights in the arbitral

99. Id.
100. Id. at 1753.
101. Id. This, of course, leaves open the field of a federal vindication of statutory rights
defense that would not be hampered by FAA preemption doctrine.
102. Id.
103. Id. The district court actually found that the plaintiffs were better off under the
arbitration agreement than they would have been as class claimants, which could take months or
years to resolve and for which the potential recovery may yield only a small percentage of a few
dollars. Id. I have examined the potential economic benefits to consumers under this type of
incentivizing agreement elsewhere. See Lampley, supra note 14, at 512–17.
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forum, 104 courts have floundered with what costs to include, and
what measure to balance the costs against. As this Article discusses
below, the different approaches can be summarized as (1) the
subjective approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the
litigant’s ability to pay; (2) the comparative approach, which
compares the costs of arbitration to the costs of proceeding in
litigation; (3) the cost/benefit approach, which compares the costs of
arbitration to the likelihood of the plaintiff’s potential recovery; and
(4) the incentive-based approach, which considers whether the
plaintiffs or their potential attorneys have any incentive, given the
costs involved, to pursue their claims.
Similarly, parties wishing to enforce arbitration agreements have
“evolved” such agreements so as to make them impenetrable to both
vindication of statutory rights and unconscionability defenses. Thus,
arbitration agreements evolved from “first generation” agreements
that were one-sided and posed the potential for large fees to the
signatory party to “third generation” consumer-friendly arbitration
agreements, like the one at issue in Concepcion. 105

A. Application of “Excessive Costs”
Surprisingly, in what is the most important case to reach the
Court regarding proper application of the vindication of statutory
rights doctrine, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the
parties spent little argument on the paradigm through which
excessive costs should be assessed. 106 Judge Jacobs criticized the
104. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (“How detailed
the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party seeking arbitration must come
forward with contrary evidence is a matter we need not discuss; for in this case neither during
discovery nor when the case was presented on the merits was there any timely showing at all on
the point.”).
105. Gilles, supra note 12, at 846–51 (providing an overview of the evolution of binding
arbitration agreements but finding that few companies have offered terms as generous as those
at issue in Concepcion); Lampley, supra note 14, at 503–13 (providing an overview of the evolution
of arbitration agreements in consumer product sales from first-generation agreements to thirdgeneration incentivizing agreements).
106. See for Brief for Petitioners at 44, Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-133), 2012
WL 6755152 (“But Randolph’s reference to ‘large arbitration costs’ does not support the Second
Circuit’s decision in this case because it was not a reference to any and all costs, whether in
arbitration or litigation. It referred to filing fees, arbitrator’s fees, and other administrative fees
imposed by the arbitral forum that would not be required to sue in court.); Brief for
Respondents at 21, Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 267025, at *44
(“Specifically, the [Randolph] Court envisioned a claimant making a particularized showing that
the costs of arbitrating under the agreement would be ‘prohibitive,’ i.e., exceed the maximum
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Second Circuit’s denial of petition for rehearing en banc because the
“large arbitration costs” relied on by the Second Circuit to invalidate
the arbitration agreement under Randolph were not the type of
“costs” properly considered under a Randolph analysis. 107 Indeed,
Judge Jacobs urged that any Randolph prohibitive costs analysis must
be limited to the “cost of access to the arbitral forum” and the price
of admission. 108 For example, Judge Jacobs identified payment of
filing fees, arbitration costs, and other arbitration expenses as
properly considered “costs.” 109 What is not a proper consideration
according to the dissenting panel were expenses that would also be
incurred in litigation, namely, expert fees. 110 Little attention has
been given to the topic, and courts approach the issue with a lack of
any consensus. 111 Surprisingly, even the Supreme Court skirted this
issue in deciding American Express. While the majority of the Court
agreed that high expert fees as compared to recoverable damages
would not justify invalidating an arbitration agreement under an
“effective vindication” rubric, the Court did not include any
reasoning as to why such costs are different from the true arbitration
costs that could and should be considered under a cost-based
defense. 112
In the first reported case to assess prohibitive costs following
Randolph, In re Managed Care Litigation, the trial court adopted a loose
balancing approach by examining the plaintiff-subscriber’s filing fees
of $250 against the plaintiff’s claimed damages. 113 Without
potential recovery.”).
107. In re Am. Exp. Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (Jacobs J.,
dissenting), denial of petition for rehearing en banc. Judge Jacobs’s dissent was joined by Judges
Cabranes and Livingston.
108. Id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. David Horton provides an overview of post-Randolph treatment of vindication of
rights challenges in his article Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights
Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 736–41 (2012). Horton argues that courts should link the
intensity of judicial review to the specific federal statute at issue. Id. at 750.
112. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013).
113. 132 F. Supp. 2d 989, 999 (S.D. Fla. 2000) modified on other grounds, 143 F. Supp. 2d
1371 (S.D. Fla. 2001) and aff’d by In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th
Cir. 2002) rev’d on other grounds by PacifiCare Health Sys. Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
Although the district court minimally addressed the prohibitive cost argument raised by the
consumer-plaintiff, the court declined to even recognize that the physician-plaintiffs could
sustain a “prohibitive costs” argument based on Randolph presumably due to their assumed
socio-economic status: “In total, the doctors are sophisticated individuals, not consumers
alleging TILA violations in connection with the purchase of a mobile home or employees suing
under Title VII.” Id. The decision in In re Managed Care eventually led to the Supreme Court’s
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discussing the potential recovery, the district court found that the
plaintiff’s “amount in controversy” was not such a “small sum” to
find that the plaintiff had met her burden of showing prohibitive
costs to vindication of statutory rights. 114 Given the Court’s only
indication of what costs should be considered in Randolph’s footnote
six, this filing fee versus recovery analysis was no large stretch, but it
still lacked any basis in precedence or application.
But courts struggled with the prohibitive cost analysis. In one of
the few cases to thoroughly consider which factors should bear
weight in the analysis, Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems,
Inc., 115 the Fourth Circuit rejected adoption of a per se rule that
would render unenforceable any employment pre-dispute arbitration
agreement that required fee-splitting of the arbitration costs. Instead
the court held that Gilmer and Randolph require a case-by-case
assessment of whether arbitration costs in the plaintiff’s particular
situation will deprive him of vindicating statutory rights in the
arbitral forum. 116 The appropriate factors to weigh in this case-bycase analysis, according to the Bradford court, are (1) “the claimant’s
ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs,” (2) “the expected cost
differential between arbitration and litigation in court,” and (3)
“whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the
bringing of claims.” 117
Bradford was not the best case in which to launch a cost-based
defense because the plaintiff had already pursued arbitration of his
ADEA claims and lost, which cast his claim that he could not afford
the arbitral forum in a suspicious light. 118 The court held that under
the three factors identified above, the plaintiff had not carried his

decision in PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406–07, in which the Court held that the applicability of a
waiver of punitive damages clause in an arbitration agreement to treble damages available under
RICO was an issue for the arbitrator to decide, and thus could not form the cornerstone of the
plaintiff’s “prohibitive costs” argument.
114. In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
115. 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001).
116. Id.
117. Id. While this inquiry may have some basis in Randolph, it is not without problems.
Should the enforcement of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement be dependent on the individual
socio-economic status of a plaintiff? At what point in time? If a plaintiff is well-off at the time he
agrees to arbitration and his financial condition changes, should that be a factor? Given the
Court’s emphasis on the prospective litigant’s waiver of rights, it suggests that the plaintiff’s
ability to afford arbitration should be viewed at the time the agreement was entered into.
118. Id. at 558 n.7 (“It therefore makes sense that the individual who claims to be
financially burdened by the fee-splitting provision should raise his objections to the fee-splitting
arrangement, including a specific forecast of his expected costs and his expected financial
burden, prior to the beginning of arbitration.”) (emphasis added).
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burden of showing that the fee-splitting provision rendered
arbitration too expensive for him to vindicate statutory rights under
the ADEA. 119 Although the plaintiff offered evidence that he was
billed $4,470.88 for his arbitration, the court held that this cost was
not insurmountable in light of his $115,000 base salary and
approximate $50,000 annual bonus. 120 The court also noted that
under the plaintiff’s arbitration agreement, he would have been
entitled to attorneys’ fees had he prevailed.121 But the plaintiff failed
to offer any evidence of the comparative cost of litigation or the
hardship he suffered by being confined to his pre-dispute contractual
choice. 122
This last factor clearly played a weighty force. The court
commented that arbitral costs can not be “measured in a vacuum” or
measured upon a conclusory statement that costs are “too high.” 123
Instead, the analysis “must focus upon a claimant’s expected or
actual arbitration costs and his ability to pay those costs, measured
against a baseline of the claimant’s expected costs for litigation and his ability
to pay those costs.” 124
The Bradford factors met with approval in many courts.125 But in
a marked twist on the individualized assessment of Bradford, the

119. Id. at 558–59.
120. Id. at 558 n.6.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 558 n.5.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1257–60 (11th
Cir. 2003) (citing Bradford factors with approval and holding that the party opposing arbitration
has “an obligation to offer evidence of the amount of fees he is likely to incur, as well as of his
inability to pay those fees”); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003)
(requiring party opposing arbitration to provide “individualized evidence that it likely will face
prohibitive costs in the arbitration at issue and that it is financially incapable of meeting those
costs”); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 609–10 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Bradford
factors with approval and remanding for discovery as to actual costs of AAA arbitration in
relation to the plaintiff’s ability to pay); Boyd v. Hayneville, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (M.D.
Ala. 2001) (finding the plaintiff’s allegations of prohibitive costs too speculative when the
plaintiff presented evidence of his own financial position, in which he earned $2,078 of income
per month, nearly all of which was by consumer household expenses, and a range of AAA
arbitrator fees based on which he estimated his costs for the arbitration would range from
$1,150 and $6,400). Despite this evidence of his personal financial status and an estimate of
potential arbitration costs, the court held the evidence too “speculative” in light of the AAA’s
provision permitting reduction of costs due to financial hardship. Boyd, 1144 F. Supp. at 1280.
There was no way to predict what the actual costs might have been. Id. Like the Bradford court,
the Boyd court relied on the lack of comparative evidence as to the cost of litigation as a “highly
relevant” basis for finding the plaintiff had not met his burden of proof. Id. at 1280 n.5 (citation
omitted).
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Sixth Circuit held in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 126 that a
claimant seeking to evade enforcement of an arbitration agreement
could do so if he proves that the “potential costs of arbitration” are
large enough to deter him and “similarly situated individuals” from
seeking to vindicate their statutory rights. 127
Under this rubric, the Morrison court instructed that the
reviewing court should “define the class of such similarly situated
potential litigants by job description and socioeconomic
background.” 128 While the court should take note of the individual
plaintiff’s income and resources, a detailed inquiry into the
household budgets of various employees would not be required.129
Further, the court should determine “average or typical arbitration
costs” because that is the information potential litigants would seek
in making a decision to pursue statutory claims. 130 The Morrison
court agreed with Bradford that there must be a comparative analysis
of the costs of litigation as compared to arbitration, but admonished
that these cases must be weighed in a realistic manner—presumably
because most plaintiffs in discrimination cases are represented by
attorneys on a contingency fee basis. 131 Finally, the court should

126. 317 F.3d 646, 658–65 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The court first rejected the
suggestion by the defendant and other courts that any cost-based defense of arbitration should
be assessed after the arbitration has taken place. As the court correctly noted, this post hoc review
of actual costs is riddled with problems: judicial review of arbitral rewards is narrow; the
plaintiff who is likely to be deterred by excessive costs will not bring the proceeding at all; and as
the Bradford court reasoned, once a plaintiff has already availed himself of an arbitral forum, an
argument that the forum deprived him of effectively vindicating statutory rights is hardly
persuasive. Id. at 660–61.
127. Id. at 663 (emphasis added). The court grounded this stretch of Randolph’s prohibitive
costs defense on Gilmer’s recognition that federal anti-discrimination statutes play both a
remedial and a deterrent role. Thus, to protect the statutory rights at issue, the court held that a
reviewing court must consider not only the arbitration’s chilling effect on the plaintiff at issue,
but whether similarly situated plaintiffs would be less likely to bring such claims, thereby
lessening any deterrent effect. Id.
128. Id. For employers who use binding arbitration agreements across employee classes,
such an undertaking may prove unwieldy with impractical results. As applied to a different class
of plaintiffs, consumers, for example, the result lacks basis—should a wealthy purchaser of a cell
phone be required to arbitrate claims whereas the indigent purchaser should not?
129. Id.
130. Id. at 664. Note that a factor not delineated by Morrison is an assessment of likelihood
to succeed on the merits—which is something that every rational potential litigant would
consider if faced with fronting a portion of costs himself.
131. Id. at 664. But what precludes an attorney from pursuing arbitration on a contingency
fee basis? See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 729, 770 (2006) (“Arbitration costs do not severely restrict, or eliminate, the advantage a
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“discount” the possibility that the plaintiff will not be required to
pay costs of fees due to success on the merits.132 Under Morrison’s
“similarly situated” subjective test, the court conceded that
arbitration agreements against high-level managerial employees
would likely be enforceable, whereas for lower-level employees, the
costs would mean the arbitral forum has a “chilling effect” on
vindication of statutory rights. 133
The application of Morrison to the facts of the case was
illuminating. The court held plaintiff Morrison’s arbitration
agreement was not enforceable because it would deter a number of
similarly situated employees from enforcing their statutory rights. 134
Under the plaintiff’s arbitration agreement, her responsibility for
arbitration fees and costs would be capped at the greater of $500 or
three percent of her annual salary—a provision that seemingly would
be arbitration “friendly.” 135 Nonetheless, the court held that these
fee-caps must be considered from the vantage point of the recently
terminated potential litigant who faces bills for other necessities and
a probable brief period of unemployment. 136 “Turning to the
arbitration agreement . . . the potential litigant finds that, as the
default rule, she will be obligated to pay half the costs of any
arbitration which she initiates.” 137 Based on “minimal research,” the
potential plaintiff would discover that arbitrating the dispute could
reach thousands, if not tens of thousands of dollars. 138 Faced with
the choice of “risking one’s scarce resources in the hopes of
uncertain benefit,” the court held that a substantial number of

consumer has under the contingency fee system. Instead, the contingent fee system provides a
mechanism for overcoming possible liquidity and risk aversion constraints due to arbitration
costs.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the court came to recognize, the most significant
expense to be considered will likely be the arbitrator’s fees and costs, which are not incurred in a
judicial forum.
132. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 664. This cost-shifting provision may be by agreement or due to
federal law.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 669.
135. Id. In the plaintiff’s case, her fees would have been capped at $1,622.
136. Id.
137. Id. Why the Sixth Circuit adopted the view that the potential litigant would give more
credence to a 50 percent splitting provision than the provision limiting fees to $500 or three
percent of the employee’s salary if arranged within ninety days of the award is never explained. Id.
138. Id. The court based this estimation on a report by Public Citizen, a consumeradvocacy organization, which, as the dissent points out, was marshaling evidence to show why
cost-splitting provisions are a “bad idea.” Id. at 669, 684.
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similarly situated persons would be deterred from seeking to
vindicate statutory rights. 139 What the court did not assess was the
proven arbitration costs as compared to the potential recovery. 140
Given the application of the fee cap, Morrison herself would face a
maximum fee of $1,622 to pursue her claim—provided she arranged
payment within ninety days of an award. Yet even under the limited
damages agreement drafted by Circuit City, Morrison stood to collect
$462,000 in damages if she prevailed. 141
Similarly, in Plaintiff Shankle’s case, 142 the court held the
arbitration agreement unenforceable when it required the plaintiff to
pay one-half of the arbitrator’s fees. Relying on information about
the “typical employment discrimination arbitration,” the appellate
court found that the arbitration in this case would cost between
$2,250 and $6,000. 143 The plaintiff was employed by the defendant
as a mechanic and a sales person. In direct contradiction to its earlier
holding, the court held: “Even without a searching inquiry into
Shankle’s income and overall financial situation, we conclude that
such a provision would deter a substantial number of similarly
situated potential litigants from seeking to vindicate their statutory
rights . . . .” 144 The court rejected the defendant’s post-dispute
offer to pay Shankle’s share of the arbitration fee. 145 These two

139. Id. at 670.
140. Even the Public Citizen report on which the court relied estimated costs from $4,350
to $11,625 for pursuing an $80,000 claim. Id. at 669. Thus, it seems that arbitral costs bear some
relation to the amount of damages, as one would expect.
141. If the limitations of damages provisions were severed from the contract, as they were
in this case, the plaintiff stood to recover even more than $462,000. Under a pure comparative
approach in which the costs of arbitration are compared to litigation, the potential recovery in
damages likely has no proper bearing unless the arbitration agreement greatly limits damages.
But it is curious in a case that is primarily based on a litigant’s subjective ability to pay (as a
member of a quasi-class), that no weight at all is given to the litigant’s potential recovery.
142. Shankle was an employee of Pep Boys facing a binding pre-dispute arbitration
agreement. This case was consolidated with Morrison for purposes of appeal on the prohibitive
costs issue. Id. at 656.
143. Id. at 676. This raises the issue of what is the proper role for an appellate court in
assessing facts in a preliminary prohibitive costs defense to a motion to compel arbitration. Are
averages enough, or should the plaintiff be held to prove what his individual arbitration is likely
to cost? If the latter, the obstacles to proof are real. How can one ever truly know, before going
through the filing fee and arbitrator selection process (and any negotiations regarding fee
waivers), precisely how much arbitral fees will be?
144. Id.
145. Since Morrison and cases like it, drafters of arbitration agreements are well-advised to
offer to pay the arbitration fees, or at least a substantial portion of them, if they know the claims
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applications show that the Morrison court was primarily concerned
with two factors: (1) the party opposing arbitration’s ability to pay
(the subjective approach) and (2) a concern about the broad social
purposes of private enforcement of federal statutory rights. This last
factor is a concern that would play heavily in light of the class
waiver.

B. Analysis of Prohibitive Costs in Light of a Class Waiver
As courts grappled with which factors could be used to establish
prohibitive costs and whether that analysis should be individualized
or should apply to a class of plaintiffs, proponents of mandatory
arbitration also began incorporating a class waiver that required the
signatory to submit any post-agreement claims to individualized
arbitration and waive any procedural right to proceed as a class. The
effect of such waivers meant that some class claims—claims not
worth pursuing in individual arbitration—simply would not be
brought. But how should the effect of these waivers be viewed in
light of Randolph’s admonition that an arbitration agreement that
deprives a prospective litigant of the opportunity to vindicate a
statutory right will not be enforced?
In Kristian v. Comcast Corp., the First Circuit became one of the
first courts to invalidate an arbitration agreement with a class
arbitration waiver because it posed “prohibitive costs” to vindicating
statutory rights. 146 The Kristian plaintiffs attempted to assert class
claims for federal and state antitrust violations against Comcast, but
Comcast’s arbitration agreement included a non-severable class

are likely to involve damages in amounts that are less than the typical arbitration. See Lampley,
supra note 14, at 512–17; see also Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 509–11 (6th Cir. 2004)
(adopting Morrison and emphasizing that a court must evaluate the cost of arbitration not only
relative to the litigant’s ability to pay, but “relative to the likely costs of litigation”).
146. 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (“If the class mechanism prohibition here is enforced,
Comcast will be essentially shielded from private consumer antitrust enforcement liability, even
in cases where it has violated the law. Plaintiffs will be unable to vindicate their statutory
rights.”). Kristian correctly recognized that there may be a question as to whether the presence
of a class arbitration bar poses a “question of arbitrability” to be decided by a court, rather than
an arbitrator under Bazzle and PacifiCare. Because Randolph was decided before either Bazzle or
PacifiCare, it did not address whether the issue of prohibitive costs preventing a prospective
litigant from vindicating statutory rights should be a question of arbitrability resolved by a court
instead of an arbitrator. Nothing, however, suggests that this question—whether a prospective
litigant is deprived of enforcing statutory rights at all due to the operation of the arbitration
clause—should be a question outside of Bazzle’s grant of authority for the court.
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arbitration waiver. 147 The plaintiffs argued that the arbitration
agreement—by depriving them of the opportunity to pursue class
claims—deprived them of the opportunity to vindicate their antitrust
claims. 148 The plaintiffs submitted expert affidavits by (1) an
attorney with twenty-six years of experience in litigating class
actions; (2) a former justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court;
and (3) an economist, who opined that to prove their claims, the
plaintiffs would have to undertake an elaborate factual inquiry that
included defining the relevant market; establishing the market power
of the defendants and the effects of potential competition;
determining the impact of any non-incumbent competitors in the
market; analyzing the alleged violative agreements, as well as any
merger/asset purchase agreements in which defendants had been
involved; analyzing rate increases over time; and otherwise
calculating damages. 149
The plaintiffs’ economist estimated that expert fees would cost
between $300,000 and $600,000, not including direct costs such as
“travel” and “computer analysis.” 150 The plaintiffs’ class-action
attorney who was proffered as an expert averred that “competent
attorneys” would “expend several million dollars of attorneys’ time
and hundreds of thousands of dollars in expenses, including expert
witness fees.” 151 According to these experts, each putative class
member’s recovery, even if trebled according to the antitrust statute,
would range from a “few hundred dollars to perhaps a few thousand
dollars.” 152 Todd, the former state court justice proffered by the
plaintiffs
as
an expert,
opined
that
“the
individual
consumer/subscriber’s cases would be extremely compromised, and
effectively precluded, without the testimony of expert witnesses.” 153
147. Id. at 30–32.
148. Id. at 37.
149. Id. at 58.
150. Id. The court never questioned the necessity of using such experts—a class-action
attorney and a former judge—as experts in an antitrust case.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 54.
153. Id. at 58. If the “costs” observed in Kristian are indeed the appropriate costs a court
should consider under a prohibitive costs argument, the next question is whether opinions
offered by judges and members of the bar opining that the costs of the case will prevent bringing
such claims are of the type admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, or whether Rule 702
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Giving no mention to the Bradford factors or even a Morrison
analysis, the court held that Comcast’s arbitration agreement was
unenforceable as drafted because it deprived the plaintiffs of the
opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights. 154 This prohibitive
costs holding was based on (1) the “complexity of an antitrust case
generally,” 155 (2) the costs of plaintiffs’ proposed expert fees as
contrasted to each plaintiff’s potential recovery, and (3) the lack of a
monetary incentive to encourage attorney representation in
individual antitrust arbitration. 156 The Kristian court failed to
recognize that even if individual claims could not be aggregated in a
formal class proceeding pursuant to the arbitration agreement,
nothing prevented the plaintiffs—and the plaintiffs’ attorneys—from
informally coordinating efforts on factual discovery, expert witness,
and litigation preparation to defray costs. Putting aside this
oversight, the Kristian court’s holding can basically be attributed to a
lack of incentives for the consumer to pursue low-dollar claims and a
lack of incentives for attorneys to represent consumers in connection
with low-dollar claims. 157 Most notably absent from Kristian’s
holding was any requirement that plaintiffs compare the costs of
proceeding in arbitration versus the costs of pursuing litigation. 158
should even apply.
154. Id. at 58–59. The Kristian court did acknowledge that the weight of circuit courts had
found no “prohibitive costs” defense based on the class-action waiver in the context of Truth in
Lending claims. See id. at 56–58 (analyzing Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374 (3d
Cir. 2000)). But the court distinguished those cases based on the complexity of prosecuting an
antitrust claim and the imbedded costs involved in fees as alleged by the plaintiffs’ experts. Id. at
58. Instead, the court likened this case, in which the plaintiffs would have no incentive to pursue
their claims, to cases in which courts had found class action/arbitration waivers unconscionable.
Id. at 60 (finding support in Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)).
155. Id. at 58.
156. Id. at 59 & n.21. Kristian recognized that antitrust statutes provide for an award of
attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs. But it reasoned that, aside from being a poor investment,
“being made whole is hardly a sufficient incentive for an attorney to invest in a case such as this
when time spent on more predictable cases would be advantageous, and frankly, rational.” Id. at
59 n.21.
157. Id. at 61. The response to the Kristian court’s vindication-of-statutory-rights decision
based on the consumer’s lack of incentives is that it would be entirely reasonable for the
prospective litigant to relinquish the right or capability to litigate expensive, complex claims with
a proportionally small payoff in exchange for the opportunity to cost effectively arbitrate more
substantial claims with a proportionally advantageous payoff.
158. The court also found the class arbitration waiver severable and ordered the arbitration
to proceed on a class or consolidated basis. Of course, this piece of the court’s holding is called
into serious doubt by Concepcion, which recognized the inherent infeasibility of arbitrating class
claims when the parties did not specifically contemplate this result. AT&T Mobility LLC v.
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Kristian’s holding that an arbitration agreement that deprives
litigants of an incentive to arbitrate claims when the litigants could
not proceed as a class caught on in the wake of class
action/arbitration waivers. In Dale v. Comcast Corp., the Eleventh
Circuit reframed the analysis as a “totality of the facts and
circumstances test” in which relevant circumstances include:
[T]he fairness of the provisions, the cost to an individual plaintiff of
vindicating the claim when compared to the plaintiff’s potential
recovery, the ability to recover attorneys’ fees and other costs and
thus obtain legal representation to prosecute the underlying claim,
the practical affect the waiver will have on a company’s ability to
engage in unchecked market behavior, and related public policy
concerns. 159

This broad “totality of facts and circumstances” test proffered by
the Dale court is a far stretch from the original Bradford cost-based
factors. It also conflates traditional “unconscionability” arguments
based on fairness of the provision and public policy with what, prior
to Kristian, was a relatively straight-forward inquiry about the cost of
arbitration as compared to litigation or the litigant’s ability to pay.
Following Concepcion, some courts have rejected the argument
embraced in Kristian that by dissolving any “incentive” to bring suit
via a class waiver, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as
prohibiting the plaintiffs from vindicating statutory rights. 160 In
Coneff v. AT&T Corp., the court was faced with the same fee-shifting
and consumer-friendly provisions present in Concepcion. 161 The
plaintiffs launched a two-pronged argument: (1) that the class
action/arbitration waiver was prohibitively expensive because the
claims at issue were worth much less than the costs of litigating
them; and (2) even if the consumer-friendly provisions of the
arbitration agreements would make plaintiffs whole, most customers
lacked any incentive to bring such claims. 162 The court held that

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011).
159. 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007).
160. Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012); Cruz v. Cingular
Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the
class-action/arbitration waiver prohibited them from vindicating statutory rights based on the
conclusion in Concepcion that under the same fee-shifting agreement, consumers would be made
whole).
161. 673 F.3d at 1158.
162. Id. at 1158–59.
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Randolph is still viable law in light of Concepcion—if a plaintiff faces
costs that would render arbitration prohibitively expensive such that
the plaintiff cannot vindicate statutory rights, then the arbitration
agreement may be unenforceable. But, on a factual basis, the Coneff
court held that the actual presence of prohibitive expenses in this
same agreement had been addressed by Concepcion, which concluded
that by virtue of the fee-shifting and “windfall” provisions, the
consumers would be made whole, if not better off, by proceeding in
arbitration as opposed to class litigation. 163 As to the argument that
no rational consumer would bring such a low-value claim
individually, 164 the Coneff court held that Concepcion precludes the
consideration of this “policy-related” concern. 165
C. Culmination of Prohibitive Costs: In re American Express Litigation
In the most anti-arbitration case since Concepcion, American
Express, the Second Circuit affirmed its prior holding(s) that the
“cost of plaintiffs’ individually arbitrating their dispute with Amex
would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory
protections of the antitrust laws.” 166 What is truly unusual about
American Express is that this agreement was between two business
entities—American Express and individual small business owners—
as opposed to between a consumer and a corporation or employer
and employee.167 In this near-classic commercial dispute, the parties
have been litigating for nine years about whether the plaintiffs’
agreement to waive the procedural opportunity to participate in
arbitration as a class is enforceable. 168 The Second Circuit visited
163. Id.; see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
164. This is an “incentive” argument as opposed to the earlier “means” argument.
165. Coneff, 673 F.3d at 1159 (relying on a one sentence response to the dissent in
Concepcion which acknowledged that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent
with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.” (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at
1753)). Whether this statement in fact foreclosed any incentive-based argument based on
prohibitive costs is indeed questionable.
166. Amex III, 667 F.3d 204, 217 (2d Cir. 2012).
167. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., No. 03 CV 9592, 2006 WL 662341 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
16, 2006) rev’d and remanded sub nom In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 302 (2d
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401
(2010) [hereinafter “Amex I”]; In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 188–89 (2d Cir.
2011) adhered to on reh’g, In re Am. Exp. Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter
“Amex II”]; Amex III, 667 F.3d at 207.
168. It is worth noting that the plaintiffs filed suit in 2003. American Express moved to
dismiss the case in favor of arbitration in 2004. Docket Entry 20, In re Am. Express Litig.
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this issue four times. 169 Each time the Second Circuit found the
arbitration agreement with class waiver to be unenforceable due to
prohibitive costs. 170 Most recently, five of the thirteen active judges
on the Second Circuit dissented from the Second Circuit’s denial of
American Express’s petition for rehearing en banc, with Judge
Cabranes appealing that “the matter can and should be resolved by
the Supreme Court” 171 and Chief Judge Jacobs declaring that
appellate review is necessary because American Express “is already
working mischief in the district courts.” 172
The American Express plaintiffs are merchants who accepted
defendant American Express’s payment card products. 173 The
plaintiffs sought to bring claims for alleged antitrust violations on
behalf of a national merchant class. 174 However, the plaintiffs each
1:03CV09592. And the parties have been caught up in the arbitration web for the past nine
years. This is certainly not the easy, streamlined alternative resolution process the parties
presumably contemplated when they originally agreed to arbitrate their claims.
169. See supra note 167; In re Am. Express Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012) (denying
petition for rehearing en banc) [hereinafter Amex IV].
170. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 206 (concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion
does not alter the Second Circuit’s previous analysis).
171. Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 149 (Cabranes, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
172. Id. at 143.
173. These plaintiffs came from two different geographic regions: New York and California.
Amex I, 554 F.3d 300, 305 (2d. Cir. 2009). The National Supermarkets Association, which
represents the interests of individually owned supermarkets, was also a named plaintiff. Id.
174. The merchant agreement to which the plaintiffs agreed included an “Honor All
Cards” provision, which required the plaintiffs to accept all American Express cards. In re Am.
Express Merchs.’ Litig., 03 CV 9592 (GBD), 2006 WL 662341 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006) at *1. At
the heart of the dispute is the distinction between “charge cards” and “credit cards.” Amex I, 554
F.3d at 305. A charge card requires its holder to pay the balance in full at the end of each billing
cycle. In contrast, a credit card permits the holder to pay a portion of the balance at the end of
each billing cycle, and interest accrues on the remaining balance. In re Am. Express Merchants
Litig., 2006 WL 662341 at *1 n.6. According to the plaintiffs, “[h]olders of charge cards are
more affluent than credit cardholders, and a vastly higher percentage of charge cards than credit
cards are held by businesses and used for business travel and other corporate purposes.” 554
F.3d at 307. Indeed, the plaintiffs alleged that Amex itself contended that “the average purchase
on an American Express card is 17% higher than the average purchase made on a credit card.”
Id. Thus, the plaintiffs-merchants wanted to attract “charge card” customers who were likely to
spend more money, and Amex has been able to charge high merchant discount fees. Id. The
plaintiffs allege that Amex’s fees were at least 35% higher than Amex’s competitor rates. Id. at
308.
By requiring that a merchant agree to Amex’s “Honor All Cards” provision, Amex was
able to leverage its market dominance in charge cards to generate equally large fees for its
burgeoning credit card business. Id. The practice of requiring a merchant to honor all of its
cards, according to Plaintiffs, amounted to an illegal tying arrangement in violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Id. Plaintiffs also asserted claims alleging that Amex
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signed an arbitration agreement waiving any procedural right to
participate in arbitration in a representative capacity or as a member
of a class. 175 Each time this case has been examined by the Second
Circuit (on initial review, and then on remand following Stolt-Nielsen
and Concepcion), the court has held, “as a matter of law,” 176 that the
costs of individual arbitration would be prohibitive. 177
The Second Circuit’s panel decisions are based on evidence
presented by the plaintiffs that is similar to that presented in
Kristian.178 The plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Dr. French, an
economist who offered opinions regarding “the likely costs and
complexity of an expert economic study concerning the liability and
damages” related to the antitrust action, and “whether it would be
economically rational for such a merchant to pursue recovery of
damages given the likely out-of-pocket costs of the arbitration or
litigation proceeding.” 179
The plaintiffs’ expert opined that the cost of his own consulting
firm’s expert assistance in “individual plaintiff antitrust cases has
ranged from about $300 thousand to more than $2 million.” 180 He
opined that the individual cost for the Amex plaintiffs would fall in
the middle of this range, 181 at something over $1 million. The
plaintiffs’ expert went on to aver that:
The median volume merchant, with half of the named plaintiffs
having more and half having less American Express charge volume,
and having reported $230,343 American Express Card volume in
2003, might expect four-year damages of $1,751, or $5,252 when
trebled. . . . The largest volume named plaintiff merchant, with
reported American Express Card volume of $1,690,749 in 2003,

maintains a monopoly by imposing a collective action waiver in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman act, and various state common law claims for unjust enrichment and violations of
California’s Unfair Competition Law. 2006 WL 662341 at *2.
175. Amex III, 607 F.3d at 209.
176. It is curious that the court framed this intensely factual-based finding as a “matter of
law.” Id. at 217.
177. Now Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor was on the panel of Amex I. Each subsequent
panel on remand has been addressed by the remaining panel of Judges Pooler and Sack. Justice
Sotomayor recused herself from the Supreme Court’s review of Amex III.
178. See supra Part IV.B. and accompanying notes.
179. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 217.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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might expect four-year damages of $12,850, or $38,549 when
trebled.

In my opinion as a professional economist . . . it would not be worthwhile
for an individual plaintiff . . . to pursue individual arbitration or
litigation where the out-of-pocket costs, just for the expert economic study and
services, would be at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed
$1 million. 182

Based on this opinion, the Second Circuit found that “trebling of
a small individual damages award is not going to pay the expert fees
Dr. French has estimated will be necessary to make an individual
plaintiff’s case” here. 183 The Second Circuit held that the district
court failed to consider that the Supreme Court has held that when a
prevailing party seeks reimbursement of fees paid to its own expert
witnesses, the federal court is bound by the limits of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1821(b)—an amount that is currently forty dollars per diem. 184
Even more importantly, the court held that the fee-shifting
provisions of the Clayton Act must be discounted to include “the
risk of losing, and thereby not recovering any fees” to fully
encompass a potential plaintiff’s evaluation of the suit’s potential
costs. 185
The court found that this cost-based analysis of the prospective
litigants’ rational choice “flatly ensures that no small merchant may
challenge American Express’s tying arrangement under the federal
antitrust laws.” 186 Because the class waiver effectively precluded the
plaintiffs from enforcing statutory rights, the court held it
unenforceable.187 The two-judge panel continued to assert two
important “caveats” to its decision: (1) that the decision “in no way

182. Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
183. Id.
184. Amex I, 554 F.3d 300, 318 (2009) (quoting Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons Inc.,
482 U.S. 437, 439, 107 (1987) superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (1991) as recognized in
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. W&O Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 620 (2000)). Whether the
district court failed to consider this limitation is not entirely clear. From the district court’s
opinion, it found that the benefits of treble damages and fee-shifting provided sufficient
incentive for plaintiffs to bring individual suit—not that the entirety of the plaintiffs’ arbitration
costs would be funded if successful. Indeed, in a litigation context rarely are the prevailing
parties able to recover 100% of costs, expert fees, and attorney fees. Amex I, supra note 166, at
*1.
185. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 218 (quoting Amex I, 554 F.3d at 317).
186. Id. (quoting Amex I, 554 F.3d at 319).
187. Id.
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relies on the status of plaintiffs as ‘small’ merchants;” 188 and (2)
that the court did not hold that class-action waivers in arbitration, or
even arbitration of antitrust matters were per se unenforceable. 189
These limitations were important because the first was an attempt to
distinguish this decision concerning commercial litigants
purportedly enforcing a federal statute from the consumer line of
cases (notably Discover Bank), rendering such clauses unenforceable
because they were unconscionable under state law. The second
limitation was the Second Circuit’s way of “saving” the decision in
this case from a wide-arching decision invalidating all arbitration
clause-class waivers, which would most likely (and eventually was
held to be) preempted by the Supreme Court.
Despite these attempts to distinguish the consumer
“unconscionability” cases, the Second Circuit’s factors it found
relevant to the vindication of statutory rights analysis look and
sound very much like those found in state common law
unconscionablity rubrics: “the fairness of the provisions, the cost to
an individual plaintiff of vindicating the claim when compared to the
plaintiff’s potential recovery, the ability to recover attorneys’ fees
and other costs and thus obtain legal representation to prosecute the
underlying claim, the practical affect the waiver will have on a
company’s ability to engage in unchecked market behavior, and
related public policy concerns.” 190
The court reconciled its opinion with Concepcion by limiting
Concepcion to the context of California’s state rule that required class-

188. Amex I, 554 F.3d at 321 (quoting Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th
Cir. 2007). This is a curious disclaimer given the express holding that “no small merchant”
would be able to challenge American Express’s tying arrangement. Id. at 218. The court
elaborated that it relied instead on the need for plaintiffs to have the opportunity to vindicate
statutory rights. The court necessarily had to make it clear that this holding rested on the
vindication of statutory rights defense to preserve its vitality after Concepcion. Id. at 219.
189. Id. at 219.
190. Id. at 213. Cf. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Ca. 2005)
overruled by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (“[W]hen the waiver is
found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting
parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with
the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money, then, at least to the extent the obligation at
issue is governed by California law, the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party
from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.
Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should
not be enforced.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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wide arbitration in circumstances that met the Discover Bank
factors. 191 To give the Second Circuit some credit, some
commentators have noted Concepcion’s enigmatic decision. 192 When
faced with the opportunity to hold that class-action waivers with
certain provisions are presumed enforceable under the FAA, the
Court did not reach so far. Instead, the Court held that the Discover
Bank rule was preempted and that the FAA did not contemplate the
complexity of class arbitration. 193
Nonetheless, Concepcion was clearly a strong pro-arbitration case.
The Second Circuit admitted as much when it stated that “it is
tempting to give both Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen . . . . a facile
reading, and find that the cases render class action arbitration
waivers per se enforceable.” 194 But the court rejected this reading and
explained that its prior Amex decisions addressed the issue of
“whether a class-action arbitration waiver clause is enforceable even if
the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of
enforcement would be to preclude their ability to vindicate their
federal statutory rights.” 195 This question, according to the court,
had not been addressed by Concepcion or Stolt-Nielsen. Thus, Concepcion
and Stolt-Nielsen, taken together, were read by the Second Circuit to
stand “squarely” for the principle that parties cannot be forced to
arbitrate disputes in a class-action arbitration unless the parties
agreed to do so. 196
In contrast to the arbitration agreement addressed by the Court’s
2011 decision in Concepcion, the Amex agreement did not contain an
imbedded fee-shifting provision by which American Express agreed
to pay some or all costs of arbitration, regardless of whether the
plaintiff prevailed. 197 It also did not have an “incentivizing clause”
by which American Express would pay an individual plaintiff a
“windfall” for claims not timely and appropriately settled by
191. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 213.
192. See, e.g., Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 31,
32 (2012) (acknowledging that the majority opinion in Concepcion is “open to multiple
interpretations”).
193. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 212 (attempting to limit Concepcion to a case concerning
preemption of a state law unconscionability rule).
194. Id. (emphasis added). While it would be a stretch to consider Stolt-Nielsen this
broadly, Concepcion comes close.
195. Id.(emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 209–10.
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American Express outside of the arbitration process. 198 Given that
the American Express merchant contract was an agreement between
two businesses (although not necessarily at “arms length”), 199 it is
not unreasonable that American Express would expect any
prospective litigant to fund its own costs of dispute resolution, as
would any commercial litigant in court. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs
conceded by the time this case reached the Court, that had such
provisions been present, they would have been unable to succeed in
the lower court on a prohibitive costs basis. 200
Thus, the Second Circuit relied on Kristian to employ a mixture
of a cost-benefit and incentive-based approach to hold that the class
waiver in the Amex arbitration agreement deprived the plaintiffs of
vindication of their antitrust claims. The court’s two-pronged
approach was based on the opinion of an economist that expert fees
would outweigh any potential plaintiff’s individual recovery (the
cost/benefit approach) and the economist’s opinion that no rational
litigant would pursue these claims (the incentive approach).
V. AMERICAN EXPRESS FAILS TO ADDRESS THE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR A COST-BASED DEFENSE
During the publication of this Article, the Court issued its
opinion in American Express. 201 As predicted, the Court reversed the
Second Circuit’s opinion in American Express and held that the
arbitration agreement is enforceable despite the plaintiffs’ lack of
economic incentives to pursue individual arbitration claims. 202 What
is somewhat surprising is that the Court’s opinion almost entirely
avoided the issue of what type of costs should be properly
considered in analyzing a cost-based defense to arbitration. 203
198. Id.
199. The district court found that the Amex merchant agreement was a form contract and
could not be negotiated with individualized terms by the merchant plaintiffs. Amex I, supra note
167, at *2.
200. Brief for Respondents at 44, Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-133), 2013 WL
267025, at *44 (“If Petitioners’ arbitration clause contained such pro-vindication clauses [such
as fee and cost-shifting], Respondents would not be here.”).
201. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
202. Id. at 2310.
203. See id. at 2317–18 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that while the majority is “quite
sure that the effective-vindication rules does not apply” it “has precious little to say about why”
and discussing the majority’s failure to address the seminal issue in the case, which is what type
of costs are properly considered in a cost-based defense to arbitration).
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The Court’s decision rested on two grounds. First, the Court
recognized an issue not specifically in contention—there is no
Congressional command in the Sherman Act or elsewhere that
antitrust laws evince an intention to preclude a class-action
waiver. 204 As the Court recognized, the antitrust laws were enacted
before Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and long before popular
use of the class waiver in arbitration. 205 Therefore, Congress would
not likely have included such a provision at the time of their
enactment. Yet the inclusion of this basis in the Court’s opinion
sends a clear message to Congress: speak clearly as to the classwaiver issue in any federal statute, or it may be subject to individual
arbitration.
The Court then turned to the central issue in the case: whether
enforcing the class-action waiver deprives the litigants of effective
vindication of rights under the antitrust laws because they had no
“economic incentive” to pursue individual arbitration claims in light of
high expert costs.206 Scalia, writing for the majority, first discussed the
origin of the “effective vindication” doctrine, recognizing it as a judgemade exception originating out of Mitsubishi Motors.207 But without
explanation, the majority called the entire existence of the effective
vindication doctrine into question by characterizing Mitsubishi’s holding,
previously relied on by courts in hundreds of cases since, as mere
“dictum.” 208 Why the Court ventured thus far is not clear from the
opinion—there was no need to call into question the “effective
vindication” doctrine to resolve this case. And the Court certainly did
not go so far as to overrule Mitsubishi or the long line of cases
recognizing the effective vindication defense. Still further, the Court’s
attempt to characterize Mitsubishi’s holding as limited to a “right to
pursue statutory remedies” appearing in a footnote is suspect.209 As
discussed in Part II.A. above, the cornerstone of Mitsubishi’s holding is
that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue
to serve both its remedial and deterrent function,” and the arbitral
forum may be enforced.210
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 2309.
Id.
Id. at 2310.
Id. See also supra notes 35–48 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id. at 2309.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
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The Court could not seriously have intended to call into question
the entire existence of this doctrine that has been the rule nearly
thirty years, as evidenced by the majority’s reliance on subsequent
cases asserting the existence of the “effective vindication”
exception. 211 Nonetheless, whether the “effective vindication”
doctrine is now narrowed to only a right to pursue, as opposed to
vindicate, federal statutory claims is something left for later cases to
resolve. Under either characterization, the possibility still exists that
exorbitant costs could pose a barrier to even pursuit of statutory
claims. The question unanswered by the Court is what type of costs
could lead to a viable cost-based defense.
There is, of course, some common ground. The majority and
dissent agree that Mitsubishi’s “effective vindication” doctrine would
“certainly” require invalidating an arbitration agreement
prospectively forbidding the right to recover under federal statutory
rights. 212 And the Court mentioned, enigmatically, that the
“effective vindication” doctrine would “perhaps” operate to
invalidate an arbitration agreement in which “filing and
administrative fees attached to arbitration . . . are so high as to
make access to the forum impracticable.” 213 The “perhaps”

Justice Kagan addressed the majority’s shortcomings on this ground in her dissent, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer: “The majority is dead wrong when it says that Mitsubishi reserved
judgment on ‘whether the arbitration agreement’s potential deprivation of a claimant’s right to
pursue federal remedies may render that agreement unenforceable.” Amer. Express, 133 S. Ct. at
2317 n.3 (emphasis added). As the dissent recognizes, the effective vindication doctrine “began
as a core part of Mitsubishi.” Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
211. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 at 2310 (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S.
247, 273–74, (2009) and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)).
Professor Jean Sternlight has written: “With this decision the Court has also fully endorsed
companies’ use of mandatory arbitration provisions to block access to justice rather than to
provide an alternative means of obtaining access to justice.” Jean Sternlight, American Express Co.
v. Italian Restaurant Guts Enforcement of Federal Laws, ADR PROF BLOG, (June 2013), available at
http://www.indisputably.org/?p=4750. American Express, limited to its holding that the
vindication of statutory rights doctrine cannot be used to render arbitration agreements
unenforceable based on an argument that plaintiffs lack economic incentives to bring such
claims, cannot be said to block access to justice. This is because plaintiffs will simply not bring
claims they otherwise would not bring in court individually. But, if American Express is construed
to mean that a true cost-based defense, in which the costs of arbitration are prohibitively
expensive under a comparative framework, is no longer a viable defense, then Professor
Sternlight’s characterization of this case meets the mark.
212. Id. at 2310, 2313. But because the “effective vindication” doctrine is likely limited to
vindicating federal rights, it would be of no help for a prospective waiver of recovery under state
law.
213. Id. at 2310–11. The dissenters would have no problem holding that the effective
vindication rule covers such filing fees. Id. at 2314 (acknowledging that an agreement might

866

DO NOT DELETE

825

1/27/2014 10:20 AM

The Price of Justice

modifying this principal is certainly a troubling foreshadowing for
future “effective vindication” cases, because the fact that arbitration
costs as compared to litigation costs could pose an impermissible
barrier to vindication of federal statutory rights has been the
accepted state of the law since Randolph. 214 And, as argued in this
Article, is the analytical framework for any cost-based defense that
adequately serves the purpose of the FAA and effective vindication of
federal law. On the other end of the spectrum, what is clearly not
covered by the “effective vindication” doctrine are “low value”
claims, which are not economically rational to pursue individually
because the costs of arbitration/litigation outweigh the potential
recoverable damages. 215 Thus, the Court inherently rejected any
rubric that would permit invalidating an arbitration clause under an
incentive-based approach alleging that the costs of individual
arbitration prevent the effective vindication of federal rights.
But what is left after American Express is some significant middle
ground with unanswered questions. In the hypothetical posed by the
dissent, Justice Kagan asks if the effective vindication rule would
prohibit an arbitration agreement that precludes a claimant from
presenting proof intrinsic to the plaintiff’s claim—such as economic
testimony? 216 The majority does not take the bait, responding only
that “it is not a given” that such a clause would constitute an
impermissible waiver. But more importantly, the majority points
out, if such a clause did render vindication of a statutory right
impossible, the result would be the same individually or as a
class. 217

prohibit vindication of statutory rights by setting “outlandish” filing fees, or establishing an
absurd statute of limitations).
214. See supra Part IV.A. The Court’s calling into question the use of a cost-based defense
based on arbitration fees as compared to litigation fees is particularly surprising given that such
dicta was not necessary to reach the Court’s holding, and the fact that some of the majority
expressed the view in oral argument that such a comparison was, indeed, proper. See infra note
240. The primary reason that the majority may be shying away from an arbitration vs. litigation
cost comparison is that it would require some “tallying” of the arbitration costs vs. litigation
costs in the enforcement phase. American Express, 133 S.Ct. at 2311–12. But this tallying should
not impose the type of costs and burdens that would be unwieldy or defeat the purpose of the
FAA.
215. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2311.
216. Id. at 2314.
217. Id. at 2311. Why is this such an important distinction? Because the plaintiffs in
American Express claimed that it was the contractual waiver of the class action that deprived them
of the ability to effectively vindicate their antitrust claims. But as the Court noted, this is simply
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In sum, although American Express continues the Court’s
favorable treatment of arbitration as the alternative path to litigation
and demonstrates that waiver of the class action is here to stay (until
or unless Congress precludes it), the Court did not specifically adopt
any framework to guide the lower courts as to how to analyze a costbased defense under Mitsubishi/Randolph.218 As discussed below, the
comparative approach is the sole approach that is consistent with
Mitsubishi, Randolph, and now American Express.
VI. ANY DEFENSE TO ARBITRATION BASED ON PROHIBITIVE COSTS
SHOULD BE BASED ON COMPARING TRUE ARBITRAL COSTS TO
LITIGATION COSTS
Since the Court’s recognition of a prohibitive-costs-based
defense in Randolph, lower courts have analyzed the costs that must
be proven to avoid arbitration under four different rubrics: (1) the
subjective approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the
litigant’s ability to pay; 219 (2) the comparative approach, which
a limitation of arbitration to the individual contracting parties, not a foreclosure of the cause of
action, prohibition of proof, or deprivation of a statutory remedy. Id. at 2311.
218. One key issue that both the Court and the dissent inadequately addressed in American
Express, was the possibility, or impossibility, of the plaintiffs sharing the costs of the allegedly
prohibitively expensive expert fees even if they could not proceed as a class. See id. at 2311 n.4
(arguing that cost-sharing was permitted)); and id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The
agreement’s problem is that it bars not just class actions, but also all mechanisms—many
existing long before the Sherman Act, if that matters—for joinder or consolidation of claims,
informal coordination among individual claimants, or amelioration of arbitral expenses.”). If
plaintiffs could have shared such fees, even in the form of a trade agreement to hire an expert,
this should have allayed any prohibitive cost concern and should have resolved the case. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594
(2012). The Court’s avoidance of this issue is confounding, particularly given the petitioner’s
concession at oral argument that such costs could be shared. Id. at 20:20–22:6.
219. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 658–65 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that “the reviewing court should define the class of such similarly situated potential
litigants by job description and socioeconomic background. It should take the actual plaintiff’s
income and resources as representative of this larger class’s ability to shoulder the costs of
arbitration” in considering whether the arbitration agreement posed prohibitive costs); Blair v.
Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 610 (3d Cir. 2002) (analyzing the litigant’s projected costs
of arbitration in comparison with evidence that the claimant would not be able to pay the equal
burden of cost due to her limited financial capacity to determine prohibitive costs); Hardin v.
Morningside of Jackson, L.L.C., 425 F. Supp. 2d 898, 900, 907–09 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (applying
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores in a four-step analysis which includes the “plaintiff’s experience,
background, and education”); Phillips v. Assoc. Home Equity Services, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840,
846–47 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (accepting evidence from the plaintiff of filing costs for arbitration and
the plaintiff’s financial straits that would prohibit her from paying, ultimately ruling that the
costs of arbitration were prohibitive); accord James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020,
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compares the costs of arbitration to costs of proceeding in
litigation; 220 (3) the cost-benefit approach, which compares the
costs of arbitration to the likelihood of plaintiff’s potential
recovery; 221 and (4) the incentive-based approach, which considers
whether the plaintiffs or their potential attorneys have any incentive
given the costs involved, to pursue their claims. 222 The source and
relevance of each of these frameworks raises concerns about the
1035 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (accepting the plaintiff’s evidence that he had no current income, savings,
nor could he afford to pay for the arbitration fees, thus making the cost-splitting provision
prohibitively expensive); Price v. Taylor, 575 F. Supp. 2d 845, 854 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(emphasizing that a party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement for prohibitive costs
based on unconscionability must prove the likelihood of incurring those costs with evidence of
plaintiff’s financial situation, and arbitration costs of similar cases).
220. See, e.g., James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting the
Plaintiff needed to provide evidence of both her own financial situation, and the comparative
expense of litigation versus arbitration costs); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 511 (6th
Cir. 2004) (following the subjective approach from Morrison v. Circuit City Stores initially, but
rounding out the analysis with a comparative approach, stating that a court must evaluate the
likely cost of arbitration relative to the likely costs of litigation); Bradford v. Rockwell
Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 n.5 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n appropriate case-by-case
inquiry must focus upon a claimant’s expected or actual arbitration costs and his ability to pay
those costs, measured against a baseline of the claimant’s expected costs for litigation and his
ability to pay those costs.”); accord Phillips v. Assoc. Home Equity Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d
840, 846–47 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (noting that plaintiff’s arbitration would be twelve times the costs
of filing in federal court).
221. See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding
that Kristian is instructive in the proper comparison analysis, and including “the cost to an
individual plaintiff of vindicating the claim when compared to the plaintiff’s potential recovery”
as a relevant factor); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that
based on the plaintiff’s experts opinion, the expert fees in arbitration outweighed any potential
damages plaintiffs would recover through individual arbitration); Amex III arguably employed a
quasi-cost benefit approach when it compared the costs of proceeding in arbitration with each
individual plaintiff’s prospective damages. 667 F.3d at 218 (concluding that it was not
“economically feasible” for the plaintiffs to pursue their claims individually, given the high
expert fees); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005) (noting that a case “sure to test this theory” is
underway, referring to In re American Express).
222. For an example of a pure “incentive-based” approached see Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673
F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012), which held that under the fee-shifting and consumer friendly
provisions of the arbitration agreement, the plaintiffs had an adequate forum for pursuing their
claims, but recognized the concern that there were no incentives to do so. See McKenzie v. Betts,
55 So. 3d 615, 627–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 60 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 2011)
(concluding that the individual plaintiffs had a slim likelihood of a small recovery, thus the
prohibitive costs prevented the plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights). See also
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1760–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning “[w]hat rational lawyer
would have signed on to represent the [plaintiffs] . . . for the possibility of fees stemming from
a $30.22 claim?”). The Coneff court concluded that such “incentive-based” policy arguments are
foreclosed by Concepcion. The Court’s opinion in American Express removes any doubt.
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appropriateness of their use for determining whether any prospective
litigant is actually deprived of vindication of statutory rights.
First, the subjective approach, which is exemplified by Morrison
and its progeny, stands for the principle that a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement may be rendered unenforceable based on the
litigant’s ability to pay for the arbitration. 223 Morrison took a
divergent path, of course, by not just looking to the means of the
actual litigant, but to all “similarly situated” litigants to determine
whether arbitral costs would be a deterrent to their assertion of
statutory claims. 224 But the most relevant inquiry, according to
Morrison, was “the actual plaintiff’s income and resources . . . to
shoulder the costs of arbitration.” 225 The importance of this factor is
highlighted by the court’s instruction to define the class of similarly
situated potential litigants by “job description and socioeconomic
background.” 226
At first blush, the subjective approach has merit. If a particular
litigant, such as a low-wage worker, simply cannot afford the arbitral
forum, then he or she should not be forced to litigate statutory
claims in that forum. Further, this approach has some grounding in
the scant guidance given by Randolph—footnote six did note that in
attempting to prove her prohibitive costs argument, the plaintiff
asserted that “[a]rbitration costs are high and that she did not have
the resources to arbitrate.” 227 Instead of rejecting the subjective
approach as a valid cost-based argument, the Court concluded that
Randolph’s evidence as to what the costs of her arbitration would be
were too speculative.228
Nonetheless, this approach makes little sense in terms of
contractual expectations. As Morrison recognized, the effect of the
subjective approach is to treat litigants differently based on income
or socioeconomic background. 229 Although it may make some sense

223. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
224. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663–64.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 n.6 (2000).
228. Id.
229. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 683 (acknowledging that “this analysis will yield different
results in different cases”).
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to treat “high-level managerial employees” (i.e., those with some
level of sophistication) differently from low-level employees who
have no discretionary income to fund arbitration of a statutory claim,
it makes much less sense to do so in other contexts. For example,
why should the affluent purchaser of a washing machine with a predispute arbitration clause in the purchase agreement be subject to
arbitration when the “low-wage” earner is not? After all, they both
paid the same price for the same product. Or worse yet, should the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement depend on whether the
model is a luxury model or base model? From this, other questions
arise: what is the proper measure of subjective ability to pay; wealth,
income, or a hybrid? Is the wealthy retiree with little to no income
less able to vindicate statutory rights than the first year law firm
associate with a high starting salary, and an enormous debt-load?
Even in the employment context, in which one might suggest
that wages earned bear some impact on the consideration given, the
reasonableness of weighing the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement against the claimant’s ability to pay is untenable. As the
Morrison court recognized, any employee, after losing his or her job,
will have a harder time funding dispute resolution than an employed
person. 230 When this analogy is extended to the commercial world,
the absurdities abound. Are only Fortune 100 companies susceptible
to binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements? Certainly that result
has already been rejected in cases like Mitsubishi, in which the
automobile dealer was held to its pre-dispute contractual agreement
with the monolith Mitsubishi Motors Corporation.
In sum, there is no reason that a wealthy or high-income litigant
should be treated differently from a low-income litigant under a
vindication of statutory rights analysis from a contractual point of
view. Presumably, at the time of entering the arbitration agreement
the parties were aware of their socioeconomic status and that their
financial situation may change (which raises a new question: should
the litigant’s ability to pay be measured at the time the agreement
was signed, at the time the dispute arises, or at the point of filing a
claim?). According to the language of Mitsubishi, the inquiry is
focused on the prospective litigant’s ability to vindicate statutory

230. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669–70 (acknowledging that the choice to pursue arbitration is
really a choice that boils down to risking scarce resources in the hopes of uncertain benefit).
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claims. 231 So long as the parties, at the time of drafting the
arbitration agreement, are not foreclosed of the opportunity to
vindicate statutory rights by choosing the arbitral forum (and it is
hard to see how they would be), the arbitration agreement should be
upheld regardless of the parties’ changed circumstances. Thus, like
the unconscionability analysis, the court’s focus under a vindication
of statutory rights analysis should be guided by the ex ante position
of the parties. 232 There may be an argument that high-wage,
managerial type employees (of the sort mentioned in Morrison) are
more sophisticated, and thus, capable of understanding the terms of
their agreement—but that is an argument more properly addressed
on state law unconscionability grounds, which typically takes into
account the relative sophistication of the parties under the
procedural fairness prong. 233
The better framework, in as much as it is based on the text of
Randolph, 234 is the comparative approach by which the costs of
proceeding in the arbitral forum are compared with the costs of
proceeding in litigation. As noted above, many courts have
emphasized this framework, including Bradford. The Bradford court
aptly explained: “[t]he cost of arbitration, as far as its deterrent
effect, cannot be measured in a vacuum or premised upon a
claimant’s abstract contention that arbitration costs are “too
high.” 235 Rather, an appropriate case-by-case inquiry must focus on
a claimant’s expected or actual arbitration costs measured against a
baseline of the claimant’s expected costs for litigation. As previously
discussed, Randolph did not elaborate on the proper factors a court
should consider under a “prohibitive costs” analysis. But the Court

231. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
232. See generally, 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 18:10 (4th ed.); U.C.C. § 2-302 official
cmt. See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt c. (“The determination that a
contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and
effect.”); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 267 (2006) (“It is clear that
proper application of the unconscionability doctrine involves an assessment of the contract ex
ante, rather than ex post.”).
233. Id.
234. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 n.6 (2000).
235. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001). See
also Ware, supra note 232 at 286–87 (arguing that a “costs-based challenge to an arbitration
agreement . . . should fail unless the total cost the plaintiff faces in arbitration significantly
exceeds the total cost the plaintiff would face in litigation”).

872

DO NOT DELETE

825

1/27/2014 10:20 AM

The Price of Justice

did note Randolph’s showing of estimated arbitration costs in
footnote six. 236 It was these estimates, based on the arbitration
agreement’s silence as to forum and fees, that were too speculative
for the plaintiff to carry her burden. But the Court did not say
analysis of arbitration costs in some manner is inappropriate—thus,
courts are left with two options: comparing arbitration costs to the
claimant’s ability to pay (the subjective approach) or comparing
arbitration costs to the litigation forum (the comparative approach).
By tracing the roots of the “prohibitive costs” doctrine back to
Mitsubishi, it becomes even more likely that the Court intended any
cost-based defense to be based on a comparison of the costs of
arbitration to the judicial forum. Mitsubishi’s preservation of a
defense based on the prospective litigant’s ability to vindicate its
statutory rights focused on the availability of vindication in the
arbitral, as opposed to the judicial forum. 237 Further, the Court left
open the possibility that a party could contest the enforcement of
dispute resolution in arbitration on the basis that it would “be so
gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for
all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.” 238 Gilmer
confirms the hypothesis that the comparative framework is
appropriate. Instead of focusing on the financial inequities between
the Gilmer plaintiff and his employer, the Court held that the
employee must arbitrate his ADEA claim. 239 Finally, during the oral
argument of American Express, Justice Scalia confirmed that in his
view, at least, the comparison of costs must be costs in arbitration as
compared to those present in litigation. 240
Further, use of the comparative costs approach would strike the
236. Id.
237. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637. This is true even if the Court continues to limit Mitsubishi
to the right to pursue statutory remedies as it was limited in dicta in American Express. See supra
notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
238. Mistubishi, 473 U.S. at 632–33 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 12 (1907)).
239. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991). Indeed, the Court
did not even mention the plaintiff’s financial status as relevant, even though Gilmer did argue
that the “unequal bargaining power” between he and his employer should be a basis for refusing
to enforce the agreement. Id. at 32–33.
240. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 594 (2012) (Scalia, J., to Appellant Q: “Let me ask you. Your effective vindication principle
depends upon a comparison with what you could do in Court. . . . You have to compare it to
court. If you couldn’t do it in court, you don’t have to be able to do it in arbitration, it seems to
me.”). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, did not engage in this analysis in American Express.
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appropriate balance between the purpose of the FAA, which is to put
arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, and
adequately ensuring that the prospective litigant has not waived
effective vindication of statutory rights. For example, if due to feesplitting provisions the arbitrator’s fee, filing fee, administrative
costs, and other true “arbitral costs” made arbitration five times
more expensive to arbitrate a discrimination claim than a litigant
would face in court, it is no far stretch to say that arbitration is
prohibitively expensive, and is not the kind of equally adequate
substitute forum for a judicial forum that Mitsubishi envisioned. This
should be true even if the prospective litigant is Warren Buffet and
can truly afford the arbitration, regardless of the costs. Of course,
this premise fits neatly within the original purpose of arbitration: “to
keep the effort and expense required to resolve a dispute within
manageable bounds.” 241 Indeed, given the rising costs of arbitration
proceedings today in commercial disputes, it would be advantageous
to all post-dispute litigants to determine whether they truly are
better off in arbitration than the courts (considering all factors,
including what should be streamlined discovery and proceedings,
reduced motions practice, and the use of arbitrators with expertise to
alleviate the costs of experts).
Another attractive reason for courts to employ the comparative
approach is that it is relatively simple. Courts are well-attuned to the
costs of proceeding in the judicial forum (filing fees, jury fees, costs
of discovery, etc.). Thus, the prohibitive costs question should focus
on: (1) how much will this arbitration cost (i.e., what are the nonlitigation based fees and costs involved); and (2) what is the
differential between arbitration and litigation? Indeed, had the
Second Circuit applied this framework to the Amex line of cases in
2009, when the plaintiffs first contested individual arbitration based
on the excessive costs of their proposed expert fees, 242 the
resolution would have been relatively straightforward. The Amex
241. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985).
As the Mitsubishi Court noted, “adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration.
The anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account when the arbitrators are
appointed, and arbitral rules typically provide for the participation of experts either employed by
the parties or appointed by the tribunal.” Id.
242. Of course, one must note that having the proposed expert for the analysis also opine
as to the necessary fees involved is a bit like putting the child in the candy shop—the expert has
every incentive to shoot the moon and inflate the fees that he or she will likely ultimately be
paid if the case goes forward.
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plaintiffs did not contend, and would have conceded, that the expert
fees would be less in pursuing individual litigation as opposed to
arbitration. The crux of their argument was that at least in litigation,
they could proceed as a class and share the costs. But the fact is that
it is not arbitration as compared to litigation that was prohibitively
expensive—as expert analysis would have been necessary in both—
but rather, it was proceeding individually as opposed to a collective
action. 243 Given the antitrust dispute at issue and the parties’
freedom in selecting the arbitrator, one would think they would
select an arbitrator well-versed enough in market analyses to cut
through some of the necessity of the costly expert testimony. In
other words, the parties should hire an expert in antitrust as
arbitrator to simplify and narrow the issues in the case. 244
The response to this argument is that given the modest amount
of damages involved, no individual litigant will bring the case. While
I dispute that idea in American Express, in which some litigants stood
to gain as much as $38,000 and the median damages were $1,751–
$5,252, the theory may be viable in other truly low value claims,
such as claims for $30. This raises the two remaining frameworks
courts have used to assess a prohibitive costs defense—the costbenefit approach and the incentive approach.
Under the cost-benefit approach, a court tasked with
determining whether a litigant should be bound by a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement would compare the likely costs of proceeding
in arbitration (again, this should be true arbitral costs, not costs
necessarily bound up in litigation) as compared to the potential

243. But there are other ways the plaintiffs could have availed themselves of cost-sharing
mechanisms. First, it is not clear at all that American Express’s “confidentiality provision”
would have prevented the plaintiffs from hiring an expert to do the same market analysis, and
different damages calculations for each. Indeed, American Express conceded that the
confidentiality provision would not prevent some sharing of expert theory between plaintiffs,
and later agreed plaintiffs could completely share the costs of the expert. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 4, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (Attorney for
Petitioners, admitting that “we have conceded below that the parties could share the costs of
that expert just as they could share the costs of a lawyer.”). Further, as Chief Justice Roberts
reminded the litigants, nothing would have prevented a trade association made up of the
litigants (or a hedge fund funding the litigation) from funding the base research and analysis of
the expert report, which could then have been used by each litigant in each individual
arbitration. Id. at 20–21.
244. The parties may still have to present individual expert opinions on individual issues,
such as damages, but as to central issues—one would think a leading expert in the field would
need little more input from the parties’ competing expert opinions.
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likelihood of recovery. As this analysis has been employed in the
past, particularly with respect to the class-action waiver, if the costs
of proceeding in arbitration were higher than the potential likely
recovery, then the arbitration clause may be invalidated on the
grounds that no rational litigant would vindicate that claim. On its
face, the problems inherent in such an analysis abound. First, each
decision about whether to resolve a dispute necessarily involves
some cost-benefit analysis, whether in court or in an alternative
forum. Even in court, pursuing claims is far from free, and the
litigant must question, are my potential damages sufficient, coupled
with my risk of losing, to justify the costs, the time, the stress and
potential emotional drain? The decision to arbitrate is no different.
Now, as argued above, if the decision to arbitrate leads to much
higher costs than litigation, it may be that the arbitration agreement
is acting as an unenforceable waiver of statutory rights. But simply
requiring the litigant to make a decision about whether a claim is
worthy of time, money, and effort is asking no more of the arbitral
litigant than the judicial.
Further still, the focal point of the parties’ agreement should be
ex ante—at the time they entered into the arbitration agreement, not
after a dispute has arisen and damages may be great or they may be
de minimis. It could very well be that parties would inherently waive
their access to courts (which certainly is not free), or governance by
the discovery procedures required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and hence, inherently agree that “small value claims” are
not worth very much of their time, in exchange for the ease of
bringing more lucrative claims in a more efficient forum. 245 By
shifting the focus to the damages likely to be recovered by a claim
that arises after the parties have agreed to arbitrate, the court
improperly shifts the position or intent of the parties from ex ante to
ex post. In sum, if it were true that merely having a claim that is not
sufficiently lucrative to justify the expense of arbitration were
enough to launch a defense based on the effective vindication of
statutory rights, then the court system would equally fail, because no
one in their right mind would assert a claim for $30 in court, if the
filing fee was $30 or more. Indeed, in many arbitration agreements
that have surfaced in recent years, the litigant with presumed
unequal bargaining power (a consumer, for example), is actually
245. See Lampley, supra note 14, at 512–17.
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better off in arbitration, fully funded by his opponent, and with the
possibility of a windfall if an appropriate settlement is not reached,
than in court.
The incentive-based framework suffers from the same infirmities
as does the cost-benefit framework. It may be that the parties were
quite willing, at the time of the agreement, to forego any incentive to
assert low-value claims. And, in low-value claims, there will also be a
question of whether there is any incentive for litigants to pursue
those claims. But the incentive-based approach has deeper problems,
because it is a policy-based reason to invalidate an otherwise valid
contractual agreement. Recall that under an incentive-based
framework, the assumption is that the plaintiff can be made whole in
arbitration, but lacks any incentive to pursue the claim and therefore
is not capable of vindicating statutory rights. But by creating
statutory rights, such as antitrust claims, anti-discrimination claims,
and predatory lending claims, Congress did not simultaneously
demand that every litigant always enforce those rights. Indeed, the
Mitsubishi Court recognized in the context of a Sherman Act claim
that the “cause of action remains at all times under the control of the
individual litigant: no citizen is under an obligation to bring an
antitrust suit, and the private antitrust plaintiff needs no executive
or judicial approval before settling one.” 246 And because the class
waiver does not interfere with the right to pursue federal claims in
arbitration (or litigation, for that matter), the Court rejected the
incentive-based approach in American Express.247
Thus, in the same way that a litigant may choose to settle a
particularly complex, expensive, or risky statutory claim for cents on
the dollar, a prospective contractual party may accept forgoing one
set of incentives (the incentive to pursue low-value claims as a
member of a class) for another (the incentive to arbitrate, potentially
at a lower premium than litigation, more meritorious claims in
exchange for a higher rate of recovery). Because the cost-benefit
approach and the incentive approach have no proper place in the
Court’s “vindication of statutory rights” jurisprudence or contractual
theory, they should not be employed by courts as frameworks under
which to invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements.

246. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636.
247. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Since Randolph, courts have struggled with how to evaluate
prohibitive costs as a defense to arbitration under the “vindication of
statutory rights” defense. Courts, depending on the context of the
dispute, have employed four different frameworks, or a hybrid of
each: (1) the subjective approach, which compares the costs of
arbitration to the litigant’s ability to pay; (2) the comparative
approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the costs of
proceeding in litigation; (3) the cost-benefit approach, which
compares the costs of arbitration to the likelihood of plaintiff’s
potential recovery; and (4) the incentive-based approach, which
considers whether the plaintiffs or their potential attorneys have any
incentive given the costs involved, to pursue their claims. An
analysis of the genesis of the “vindication of statutory rights
defense” and the purposes it serves, that of the FAA and federal
comity, reveals that the only framework that courts should employ
to render an arbitration agreement unenforceable due to prohibitive
costs is one that contrasts true arbitration costs from those that
would be incurred in the judicial forum. Although the Supreme
Court inherently rejected the incentive-based approach in American
Express, it offered no guidance to lower courts as to what costs
should be considered in analyzing a cost-based defense, other than to
question the bases of the cost-based defense. Despite the Court’s
questionable narrowing of Mitsubishi’s “effective vindication”
doctrine, a viable defense based on truly prohibitive costs should still
exist, as the Court has never overruled Mitsubishi, Randolph, or any of
the cases recognizing arbitration as an alternative forum for
vindicating such rights. But the proper framework for analyzing such
a defense is whether the costs of the arbitral forum as opposed to the
judicial forum (i.e. costs only incurred in arbitration) pose a
prohibitive barrier to pursuing those federal statutory claims.
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